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The New Insider Trading 
Karen E. Woody* 
ABSTRACT 
Pursuant to the SEC’s Rule 10b-5, in order to obtain a conviction for 
insider trading based upon a tipper-tippee theory, the government must prove 
that the tipper received a personal benefit for the tip, and that the tippee knew 
about that benefit. The last five years of blockbuster insider trading cases 
have focused on this seemingly nebulous personal benefit test, and the 
Supreme Court has been unable to clear the muddy waters. As a result, the 
parameters of insider trading remain hard to pin down and often shift 
depending on the facts of the most recent case. Two terms ago, the Supreme 
Court, in an unsurprising unanimous decision in Salman v. United States, 
reaffirmed the holding of Dirks, from which the personal benefit test arose. 
The Court in Salman, however, failed to elucidate the more problematic 
areas of insider trading, including the application of the personal benefit test 
if the tippee is not a trading relative or friend. Legal practitioners, 
legislators, and academics have offered up various solutions for the problem 
of having an amorphous law against insider trading, yet none have 
succeeded. 
This Article suggests that the hubbub over defining the personal benefit 
element of insider trading—sure to reach a fever pitch the next time a cert 
petition on the issue is granted—may be misguided. This is because there may 
be a simpler way to bring an insider trading case. Since Sarbanes-Oxley, 
there has been a sleepy provision of the criminal code that could present an 
end-around to the morass of insider trading precedents under Rule 10b-5. 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1348, the government can bring an insider trading case 
under the more general umbrella of securities fraud, which has scant 
jurisprudential precedent. In other words, the heavily litigated personal 
benefit test found in Dirks may not apply to a charge of insider trading under 
§ 1348. The elements required to prove a charge under § 1348 are similar to 
 
* Assistant Professor, Washington & Lee University School of Law. The author would like 
to thank John P. Anderson, Donna Nagy, Andrew Vollmer, Joan Heminway, Peter Henning, Eric 
Chaffee, George Mocsary, Jeffrey Kidd, Kevin Douglas, Ellen Podgor, David Kwok, Michael 
Guttentag, as well as Jessica Erickson, Verity Winship, and other participants in the Junior 
Scholars Forum at the University of Richmond School of Law, as well as the Securities Litigation 
Workshop. Finally, the author wishes to thank Amy Dillard for her support. All errors are the 
author’s. 
52:0594] [THE NEW INSIDER TRADING] 595 
 
other fraud-based offenses such as mail and wire fraud, health care fraud, 
and bank fraud. Whether § 1348 was intended to apply to insider trading in 
particular is an open question, and a broader question is whether the 
jurisprudential interpretation for the elements of the crime of insider trading 
as defined under Rule 10b-5 should be imported into the judicial 
interpretation of § 1348. In other words, if the conduct that constitutes 
criminal insider trading under Rule 10b-5 exists only if the elements of the 
Dirks test are met, then a § 1348 charge for criminal insider trading may 
create an entirely new scheme and definition of the crime. This Article 
analyzes the potential of this dual paradigm and argues that, given the 
uncertainty and shifting parameters of insider trading prohibitions, 
application of § 1348 to insider trading should be afforded the rule of lenity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Insider trading is not going away. The legal headaches surrounding 
prevention, regulation, and prosecution of insider trading seem to have 
increased rather than decreased in recent years. The parameters of insider 
trading, as charged under Rule 10b-5, are thorny for myriad reasons. First, 
since the Powell decisions of the 1980s,1 insider trading is not per se illegal.2 
The Powell court rejected the idea that all trading on inside information is 
prohibited.3 Thus, the comparisons to other crimes, and the attendant 
regulatory “fixes” that are available to assist in curbing other types of 
prohibited activity, are likely overbroad when applied to insider trading.4 
 
1. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 652 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225 
(1980); see infra Part I.B. 
2. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233–37. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an 
Excuse—But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 129 (1997) (distinguishing between a 
malum prohibitum crime, which is wrong only because it is prohibited by law, and a malum in se 
crime, which is a moral wrong, independent of law). Insider trading is a malum prohibitum crime 
in certain circumstances and therefore more open to interpretation by the judiciary. This fact 
creates the legislative and judicial morass in which insider trading doctrine exists because there 
are numerous carve-outs based on relationship status and fiduciary duty. See also infra Part IV 
and accompanying notes. 
 3. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232–33. 
4. See, e.g., Miriam Baer, Insider Trading’s Legality Problem, 127 YALE L.J.F. 129, 129–
30 (2017), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/Baer_1hb7mucv.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE6J-
NNWF] (setting up a hypothetical analogizing insider trading to cocaine distribution). While a 
helpful example in relation to explaining tipper-tippee theory and conspiracy, the fact that cocaine 
distribution is always illegal makes the analogy lack full application to insider trading. 
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Second, when insider trading is prohibited, the crime itself is hard to 
define. Prosecutors apply criminal fraud elements to an activity that is defined 
by tort law concepts of breaches of duty.5 A majority of scholars focus on the 
property law concepts at play, arguing that the prohibition on insider trading 
can be understood as a means of protecting the firm’s rights to information 
as a property right.6 Under this lens, insider trading is theft, or 
embezzlement.7 This combination of criminal, tort, and property theories 
highlights the question of who or what is the actual victim of insider trading. 
Is the victim the market at large?8 The company whose information has been 
misappropriated or sold?9 Shareholders?10 Or someone else entirely? 
 
5. Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94 
IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1320 (2009) (acknowledging the gap in insider trading doctrine after United 
States v. O’Hagan wherein the crime of insider trading is defined as use of material non-public 
information regardless of a breach of fiduciary duty); see also John P. Anderson, Greed, Envy, 
and the Criminalization of Insider Trading, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 1, 5 (2014) (analyzing the purpose 
of applying criminal law to inside trading); Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE 
L.J. 511, 519–20 (2011) (dissecting the elements of fraud and the unique concept of securities 
fraud as demanding both a private remedy and public sanction while also diluting the requisite 
intent). 
6. See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND POLICY 
67 (1991) (noting that the only “conceivable justification for banning insider trading is that such 
trading involves the theft of valuable corporate property”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider 
Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 
52 SMU L. REV. 1589, 1592 (1999) (noting that “insider trading ought to be regarded as a property 
rights problem rather than a securities fraud issue”); Zachary J. Gubler, Insider Trading as Fraud, 
98 N.C. L. REV. 533, 560–61 (2020) (promoting the misappropriation theory of insider trading). 
But see Roberta S. Karmel, Outsider Trading on Confidential Information—A Breach in Search 
of  Duty, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 113 (1998) (arguing that Congress was concerned with fairness 
and the protection of investors when it passed the Exchange Act (which houses § 10(b)) and not 
the protection of property rights in information). 
7. See, e.g., SEC v. Payton, 97 F. Supp. 3d 558, 559 (S.D.N.Y 2015) (describing insider 
trading as a “form of cheating, of using purloined or embezzled information to gain an unfair 
trading advantage”); Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider 
Trading: A Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1265–67 (1998); A.C. Pritchard, 
United States v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy for the Law of Insider 
Trading, 78 B.U. L. Rev. 13, 28 (1998). 
8. See Kenneth R. Davis, Insider Trading Flaw: Toward a Fraud-on-the-Market Theory 
and Beyond, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 51, 73–74 (2016). But see Pete Brush, Rakoff Tells Gov’t to Dump 
‘Level Playing Field’ Language, LAW360 (Apr. 16, 2019), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1150320/rakoff-tells-gov-t-to-dump-level-playing-field-
language [https://perma.cc/BH4C-6TLD] (quoting Judge Rakoff as telling prosecutors to abandon 
a theory of ultimate fairness in the stock market). 
9. See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1607; Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 858 (1983). 
10. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 719–20 (1986) (analyzing the costs of private litigation, including in cases 
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Defining who the victim is inherently defines what the criminal or prohibited 
act is. Yet because there is no explicit statutory prohibition on insider trading, 
the doctrine is entirely based on common law, with wide-ranging 
discrepancies regarding how the crime is defined.11 
Third, in tipper-tippee cases, whether or not the crime of insider trading 
has occurred is dependent upon the relational distance between the tipper and 
tippee. In other words, a tipper who is related to, or a close friend of, the 
tippee has committed insider trading, whereas a tip to a stranger does not 
meet the elements of the crime, pursuant to the 1983 case of Dirks v. SEC.12 
As a result, each new case that presents different relational distances between 
tipper and tippee creates essentially an issue of first impression to the court, 
and the court must prescribe a new definition of personal benefit with each 
opinion. One only needs to look at the Salman case from OT 2016 to 
recognize that a number of unanswered questions remain regarding the limits 
of the personal benefit test.13 
Because of these issues—and potentially others—practitioners, 
prosecutors, legislators, and legal academics have wrestled with how best to 
solve the morass of insider trading law.14 On one hand, some suggest a statute 
explicitly banning insider trading would provide the desired solution. 
Professor Miriam Baer argues for such a legislative fix to create clarity of 
definition and suggests tiers of criminality to apply to insider trading 
violations.15 Professor Jill Fisch, on the other hand, has argued the judicial 
development of insider trading doctrine is advantageous because of the 
 
alleging insider trading among corporate executives); Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, 
The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 714 (2006) (arguing that only 
information traders are benefited by securities regulation). 
 11. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on Material 
Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 889 (2010) (stating that regulating insider trading 
“through an antifraud rule is like trying to fit a square peg into a round hole”). 
12. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663–64 (1983); see also United States v. Newman, 773 
F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that the Dirks standard required “proof of a meaningfully 
close personal relationship that generates an exchange . . . [of] at least a potential gain of a 
pecuniary or similarly valuable nature”). 
13. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 424 (2016). 
14. See, e.g., The Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019) 
(superseding § 10(b) and forbidding trading in material non-public information if individual trader 
is aware of or recklessly disregarded that the information was wrongfully obtained or 
communicated); see also Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act of 2015, S. 702, 114th Cong. (2015); 
Rachel Graf, Bharara Group To Explore Changing Insider Trading Law, LAW360 (Oct. 11, 
2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1090917/bharara-group-to-explore-changing-insider-
trading-law [https://perma.cc/3TBY-5SGE]. 
15. Baer, supra note 4, at 134. 
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difficulty in pinning down exactly what insider trading is.16 Fisch asserts that 
judicial lawmaking in this area is optimal because federal judges are 
ostensibly more insulated from political pressure than are SEC employees or 
congressional representatives.17 
A recent case decided by the Second Circuit provided some answers to the 
debates surrounding insider trading. United States v. Blaszczak is an insider 
trading case wherein the defendant was acquitted of insider trading under the 
traditional Rule 10b-5 charge but was found guilty under a relatively newer 
statutory prohibition, 18 U.S.C § 1348.18 That is, the jury held that the 
government could not prove the elements of insider trading under Rule 10b-
5, including the personal benefit test, but the jury nonetheless found 
defendants guilty of general securities fraud under § 1348. The Blaszczak 
case presents a potential “new”19 fix to insider trading by way of prosecuting 
under § 1348, yet that statute proves to be as nebulous as Rule 10b-5. Neither 
Rule 10b-5 nor § 1348 mentions the term “insider trading.” In other words, 
18 U.S.C. § 1348 could provide a statutory end-around the Rule 10b-5 morass 
but leaves available the same amount of judicial discretion in its 
interpretation. 
The Blaszczak decision tees up at least two interesting theoretical 
questions: first, whether it can be argued that § 1348 is merely the same 
charge as Rule 10b-5, creating an issue of “dual-charging,” or multiplicity of 
charges.20 This question was not addressed by the Blaszczak court and seems 
to be dismissed by many prosecutors as frivolous given that they argue there 
 
16. Jill E. Fisch, Constructive Ambiguity and Judicial Development of Insider Trading, 71 
SMU L. REV. 749, 752 (2018); see also Linda S. Eads, From Capone to Boesky: Tax Evasion, 
Insider Trading, and Problems of Proof, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 1421, 1456 (1991). 
17. Fisch, supra note 16, at 758. 
18. United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 26 (2d Cir. 2019). 
19. 18 U.S.C. § 1348 is hardly a “new” statutory fix. It was enacted as part of Sarbanes-
Oxley, was modeled after the mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and § 1343, and 
mirrors much of the language of Rule 10b-5. The legislative history for this provision makes clear 
that Congress intended to “supplement the patchwork of existing technical securities law 
violations with a more general and less technical provision, with elements and intent requirements 
comparable to current bank fraud and health care fraud statutes.” S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 14 
(2002); 148 CONG. REC. S7420 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy). However, 
only a few recent cases have involved a charge of 18 U.S.C. § 1348 in insider trading cases. See 
Peter J. Henning, A New Way To Charge Insider Trading, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/25/business/dealbook/a-new-way-to-charge-insider-
trading.html [https://perma.cc/665R-8GFQ]. 
20. Only a few courts have heard this argument and decided that a Rule 10b-5 charge is 
different from a § 1348 charge because only one requires willfulness. United States v. Jun Ying, 
No. 1:18-cr-00074-AT-RGV, 2018 WL 7016349, at *2–3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 17, 2018); United 
States v. Hussain, No. 16-cr-00462-CRB-1, 2017 WL 4865562, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2017). 
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is a difference between Rule 10b-5 and § 1348 based on the intent 
requirement; violators of § 1348 must act “knowingly” and with the intent to 
defraud, whereas Rule 10b-5 prosecutions require proof of willingness.21 
Second, and more importantly, the Second Circuit held that the court was not 
required to import elements and definitions from § 10(b) jurisprudence 
related to insider trading into its analysis under § 1348. In other words, the 
Second Circuit held that it need not consider the decades of precedent related 
to insider trading under Rule 10b-5 when opining on an insider trading charge 
under § 1348. The result of this holding is that insider trading is easier to 
prove under a criminal statute than the related civil statute and could mean 
the end of the SEC’s role in policing insider trading given that the agency 
only has civil authority to do so. 
In Part I, this Article outlines the long jurisprudential arc of traditional 
insider trading prosecutions under Rule 10b-5 and its dynamic elements 
under common law. In Part II, this Article considers the legislative history 
and the relatively scant common law background of § 1348 as applied to 
insider trading prosecutions. Part III analyzes the use of § 1348 as both an 
addition and a substitute for Rule 10b-5 prosecutions of insider trading. In 
doing so, this Article first will address whether a dual charge for insider 
trading under Rule 10b-5 and § 1348 is in violation of Blockburger; secondly, 
Part III contemplates whether the judicial interpretation of insider trading as 
hashed out in Rule 10b-5 cases should be imported into § 1348 caselaw. 
Finally, in Part IV, this Article considers the policy ramifications of creating 
a new insider trading regime under § 1348. This Part will consider the issue 
that the burden for proving criminal insider trading under § 1348 will be 
lower than proving the personal benefit test standard under Rule 10b-5, 
thereby inverting civil and criminal standards for the same activity, among 
other problematic ramifications. Given these potential ramifications and the 
lack of concrete parameters for insider trading under § 1348, this Part 
addresses whether the rule of lenity should apply to § 1348 prosecutions of 
insider trading. 
I. INSIDER TRADING UNDER § 10(B) AND RULE 10B-5 
Despite insider trading being a crime punishable by both fines and 
incarceration, the underlying statute upon which liability is premised never 
mentions the term “insider trading.” Instead, § 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 states the following: 
 
21. Sandra Moser & Justin Weitz, 18 U.S.C. § 1348—A Workhorse Statute for Prosecutors, 
66 DEP’T JUST. J. FED. L. & PRAC. 111, 121 (2018). 
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It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use 
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the 
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . . (b) 
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security 
not so registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors.22 
When the SEC promulgated its related rule, Rule 10b-5, it also failed to 
mention, define, or explicitly prohibit insider trading. The SEC Rule 
attendant to the 1934 Exchange Act § 10(b) states, 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use 
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the 
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.23 
At base, there are four critical elements to insider trading. First, the 
information must be material;24 second, the information must be non-
 
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018). 
 23. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020). Some scholars have noted that the statute never intended 
to prohibit insider trading. See Bainbridge, supra note 6, at n.24; Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement 
of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 55–69 (noting the absence of congressional 
concern regarding insider trading in the legislative history of the 1934 Act); see also Brief for 
Petitioner at 21, Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016) (No. 15-628), 2016 WL 2732058. 
24. The Supreme Court has said that information is material if “there is a substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important” in making an investment 
decision. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). This threshold is met 
when a reasonable investor would consider the information as “having significantly altered the 
‘total mix’ of information made available.” Id. Generally, certain categories of information will 
meet the materiality threshold, including: (1) earnings reports; (2) mergers, acquisitions, tender 
offers, joint ventures, or changes in assets; (3) new products, discoveries, or developments; (4) 
changes in control or management; (5) change in auditors; (6) events regarding the issuer’s 
securities; and (7) bankruptcies or receiverships. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 
Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,721 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243, 249). 
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public;25 third, the individual must trade on the basis of that 
information;26 and fourth, in most cases, the individual must breach a 
duty of trust or confidence owed to another individual or entity by 
making the trade.27 Each of these four elements has emerged as a 
result of litigation, meaning courts have defined and sharpened the 
edges of the law. 
With such an arguably vague statutory standard upon which to establish 
liability for insider trading, the law of insider trading has been shaped almost 
entirely by common law, in the form of SEC administrative actions and 
judicial opinions.28 In fact, Rule 10b-5 was famously described by Justice 
Rehnquist as “a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a 
legislative acorn.”29 As a result, the contours of insider trading’s definition 
and related prohibitions are vulnerable to sweeping changes depending upon 
the different factual scenarios presented in each new case. The following 
overview details the original cases related to insider trading and how the 
common law has evolved in the past fifty years, which is critical to 
understanding why insider trading is hard to pin down. 
 
25. Courts have adopted two theories to determine whether information is public. Under the 
first theory, information is public if it has been disseminated broadly to the investing public. SEC 
v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968). Under the second theory, information 
is public when it has been “fully impounded into the price of the particular stock.” United States 
v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 601 (2d Cir. 1993). In 2000, the SEC clarified its position that 
information on a company’s website is considered public where the disclosure is “reasonably 
designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the public.” See 
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. at 51,723 (adopting, among other things, 
Regulation FD and Exchange Act Rule 10b5-2). 
26. According to the SEC’s definition, a person is liable for insider trading under Rule 10b-
5 “if the person making the purchase or sale was aware of the material nonpublic information 
when the person made the purchase or sale.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b) (2020) (emphasis added). 
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2020). Under classical and tipper-tippee theories, the insider 
or tipper must violate a fiduciary duty to the company that typically exists due to the insider’s 
position in the company. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983) (holding that “the 
tippee’s duty to disclose or abstain is derivative from that of the insider’s duty”); Chiarella v. 
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (holding that “a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not 
arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information”). 
 28. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Watching Insider Trading Law Wobble: Obus, 
Newman, Salman, Two Martomas, and a Blaszczak 1 (Nov. 11, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3227&context=facpub 
[https://perma.cc/T6AM-8F82] (“[N]either the statute nor the rule addresses insider trading 
explicitly, leaving to the judiciary to do all the work of fashioning legal doctrine about when and 
why insider trading operates as securities fraud.”). 
29. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975). 
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A. Judicial Creation of Insider Trading: Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf 
Sulphur 
In 1961, the SEC brought an enforcement action that created the 
prohibition on insider trading.30 In a case of first impression, In re Cady, 
Roberts & Co., the board of directors of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation 
decided to reduce the company’s dividend.31 Cheever Cowdin, a director for 
Curtis-Wright, was also a partner in the stock brokerage firm of Cady, 
Roberts & Co.32 Cowdin told one of his partners, Robert Gintel, about the 
dividend cut, and Gintel sold shares of Curtiss-Wright stock that were held 
in customer accounts.33 The result was that Cady, Roberts’s customers 
avoided significant loses because their Curtiss-Wright stock had been sold 
before the dividend cut was made public.34 
The SEC administrative court held that Gintel had violated Rule 10b-5, 
despite not being the original insider who possessed the information.35 The 
administrative ruling detailed what became known as the “disclose or 
abstain” rule, which holds that an insider in possession of material non-public 
information must disclose the information before trading or abstain from 
trading.36 The significance of Cady, Roberts is that it represents one of the 
first cases cementing the prohibition against insider trading. However, Cady, 
Roberts was an SEC administrative proceeding, not a criminal case, which 
created questions of its precedential value.37 
Eight years after Cady, Roberts, the Second Circuit weighed in on insider 
trading and Rule 10b-5. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur was a seminal case that 
solidified the “disclose or abstain” rule within securities law.38 Unlike in 
Cady, Roberts, the defendant in Texas Gulf Sulphur (“TGS”) was charged 
with classical insider trading based on the following facts. In 1959, TGS, an 
oil company, learned through ground surveys and ground samples that 
 
30. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961); see also Donald C. Langevoort, 
Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1319, 1319 (1999). 
31. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 908. 
32. Id. at 909 n.4. 
33. Id. at 909. 
34. Id. at 909–10. 
35. Id. at 916–17. See generally HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK 
MARKET 12–15 (1966) (providing an in-depth discussion of the thought process and reasoning of 
Professor William Cary, Chairman of the SEC and author of the opinion). 
36. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 911. 
37. See The SEC Takes Command in the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Company, SEC HIST. 
SOC’Y, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it/takeCommand_b.php#ftn17 
[https://perma.cc/NF48-VRD8]. 
38. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). 
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significant deposits of copper and zinc lay in Ontario.39 The president of TGS 
failed to tell the other directors and employees about the information and 
ordered the individuals involved in the exploration to keep quiet about the 
discovery.40 TGS eventually acquired rights to the Ontario land and 
announced the discovery in 1964.41 However, a number of insiders had 
bought stock or options in 1963, prior to the announcement in April 1964.42 
Some insiders tipped outsiders. Others accepted stock options authorized by 
the board without informing the directors of the discovery. Stock jumped 
222% from November 1963 to May 1964.43 
The Supreme Court denied cert in this case, leaving the Second Circuit 
opinion to stand as the first federal ruling on what constitutes inside trading.44 
The Second Circuit held that if any individual has material non-public 
information, she must either disclose that information or abstain from 
trading.45 This case underscored the “equal access to information” policy as 
the bedrock principle for investor protection and market integrity. The 
Second Circuit agreed with the SEC that Rule 10b-5 was intended to assure 
that “all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal 
access to material information” and that “all members of the investing public 
should be subject to identical market risks.”46 
B. Powell Jurisprudence and the Fiduciary Duty Test 
The TGS “disclose or abstain” doctrine became the cardinal rule regarding 
insider trading until the mid-1980s, when Justice Powell single-handedly 
reshaped the law of insider trading. Through a pair of Supreme Court 
decisions authored by Powell, insider trading shifted from being an absolute 
bar on trading while in possession of inside information to becoming a more 
complicated question regarding fiduciary duty and personal benefit.47 The 
two cases that created the new contours of insider trading remain the 
 
39. Id. at 843. 
40. Id. at 844. 
41. Id. at 846. 
42. Id. at 844. 
43. Id. at 847. 
44. See Hazen, supra note 11, at 891 n.49. 
45. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848. 
46. Id. at 848, 852. 
47. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Seeking an Objective for Regulating Insider Trading Through 
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 71 SMU L. REV. 697, 699 (2018) (noting that after TGS, the rationale went 
“from the clarity of parity of information to the mist of fiduciary duty”). 
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architecture of insider trading law today.48 For this reason, a close look at 
these cases is critical in order to grasp the nuances in the more recent case 
law. 
1. Chiarella v. United States49 
Chiarella was an employee of Pandick Press, a financial printer 
company.50 Pandick used codes to conceal names of companies involved in 
tender offer deals, but Chiarella broke the codes and purchased target 
company shares before the bids were announced.51 Chiarella was convicted 
of insider trading in the district court, and the decision was affirmed by the 
Second Circuit.52 
The Supreme Court, with Justice Powell authoring the opinion, reversed 
the conviction.53 The Court held that Chiarella had not committed insider 
trading because he had no fiduciary relationship to the companies whose 
stock he traded.54 Rather, the Court reasoned, Chiarella merely worked for 
Pandick Press, which was not an agent of the companies.55 The Court opined 
that the lack of any fiduciary duty meant that there was no breach of duty, 
and therefore no fraud. In what may be the most oft-quoted line that has 
launched innumerable law review articles and scholarly debate, the Court 
stated, “there can be no fraud absent a duty to speak.”56 
Powell’s decision in Chiarella represents the first outright rejection of the 
“equal access to information” definition of insider trading. The “disclose or 
abstain” bedrock principle from TGS became significantly narrowed after 
Chiarella and required a duty that arises from a relationship of trust and 
confidence between the parties. Powell underscores out that Chiarella was 
not a fiduciary or an agent; he was a complete stranger to the companies in 
which he traded stock. Because of this fact, Chiarella merely “happened 
 
48. See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the 
Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 930 (2003) [hereinafter Pritchard, Counterrevolution 
in the Federal Securities Laws]; Pritchard, supra note 7, at 18–22. 
49. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
50. Id. at 224. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 225. 
53. Id. at 224–25. 
54. Id. at 231–33. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 235 (holding that “a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere 
possession of nonpublic market information”). 
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upon” inside information, which, the Court held, was not a violation of any 
fiduciary duty and therefore did not give rise to the crime of insider trading.57 
The Chiarella opinion created shockwaves and garnered a variety of 
criticisms. As Stephen Bainbridge summarized, “after Texas Gulf Sulphur, 
the question was how large a net should the prohibition cast; after Chiarella, 
the question was how broad should be the scope of immunity created by the 
new fiduciary relationship requirement.”58 The Chiarella opinion was not 
unanimous and included a vibrant dissent from Justices Marshall and 
Blackmun, who argued that neither the statutory text nor the legislative 
history supported the breach of duty requirement that Powell inserted.59 
Blackmun argued that securities laws are intended to ensure market fairness 
broadly.60 He advocated for a broad rule banning the use of non-public 
information not lawfully available to the market.61 Chief Justice Burger also 
dissented, arguing that illegal insider trading takes place whenever someone 
trades with information obtained through unlawful means.62 Interestingly, 
Justices Brennan and Stevens concurred with the majority in reversing the 
conviction but on a procedural issue that the jury had not been instructed 
properly.63 
2. Dirks v. SEC64 
The Powell decision in Chiarella set the stage for what remains the most 
important case in insider trading law today. Dirks v. SEC created the morass 
in which courts and litigants find themselves in now. The Dirks opinion 
added a new relational element to tipper-tippee liability, which cannot be 
 
57. Id. at 232–33. Under the misappropriation theory, the duty arises out of an agreement, 
relationship, or course of conduct between the source of the information and the recipient that 
requires the recipient to keep the information confidential. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 
521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (holding that the misappropriation theory applies where an individual 
misappropriates confidential information for the purpose of trading in a security in violation of a 
duty owed to the source of the information). Under the “outsider trading” theory, there does not 
need to be a duty (and breach) where an individual affirmatively misrepresents himself in order 
to trade on a security. See SEC v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 51 (2d Cir. 2009). 
58. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Law and Economics of Insider Trading: A Comprehensive 
Primer, (Feb. 2001) (manuscript at 18) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=261277 [https://perma.cc/A3HF-6D55]. 
59. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245–46 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
60. Id. at 248. 
61. Id. at 249–50. 
62. Id. at 239–40 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). This Chiarella dissent foreshadowed the 
misappropriation theory established later in O’Hagan. See supra note 57. 
63. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 237–39 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
64. 463 U.S. 646, 648 (1983). 
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defined cleanly, thus creating a new wrinkle in insider trading law with each 
new case presented to a court. 
The facts of Dirks are compelling and may explain why the Court created 
an entirely new element of insider trading. Equity Funding Corp. of America 
engaged in serious accounting fraud.65 Dirks was a securities analyst who 
uncovered the fraud, thanks in part to Ronald Secrist, a former officer of 
Equity Funding who had told Dirks about it. Dirks tried to alert the SEC to 
report the fraud.66 He also contacted the Wall Street Journal (the “Journal”) 
and leaked the story.67 The Journal refused to publish the story, claiming it 
would be libelous.68 Dirks also told the fraud to some of his clients, and those 
clients subsequently sold their holdings in Equity Funding.69 Eventually, the 
fraud at the company came to light, and the exchanges stopped trading on the 
stock because of its drastic losses.70 The SEC, however, after its investigation 
into Equity Funding, opened an investigation on Dirks, the whistleblower, for 
insider trading because he told his clients about the information about Equity 
Funding that he learned from Secrist.71 
Dirks was found guilty of insider trading in the lower courts.72 After all, 
under the logic of TGS, his was a fairly open-shut case involving the 
disclosure of material non-public information to his client, and they traded 
on that information. Yet, at the time Dirks was decided, the Chiarella holding 
was in force, requiring a fiduciary relationship, or at least a relationship of 
trust a confidence, in order to meet the elements of insider trading.73 
For this reason, the Supreme Court reversed Dirks’ conviction, thereby 
reaffirming the rejection of the TGS standard of equal access to information. 
Justice Powell wrote for the majority and stated that there is no violation of 
Rule 10b-5 absent a breach of fiduciary duty, echoing his opinion in 
Chiarella.74 However, Powell went on to state that to prove a breach of 
fiduciary duty, the government needs to show that the tipper received “a 
monetary or personal benefit” either directly or indirectly.75 The tippee is 
 
65. Id. at 649; see also A.C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 68 SMU 
L. Rev. 857, 857–58 (2015) (reviewing the Newman decision in light of the benefit test that arose 
out of Dirks and analyzing the elements of the Dirks test). 
66. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648–49. 
67. Id. at 649. 
68. Id. at 649–50. 
69. Id. at 650. 
70. Id. at 650–51. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 651–52. 
 73. See id. at 654–55. 
74. Id. at 654; Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980). 
75. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667. 
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equally liable if the tippee knows or should have known there has been a 
breach of fiduciary duty.76 Based on this logic, the Court reasoned that Dirks 
should not be found liable of insider trading because he did not receive any 
personal benefit for the tip.77 In other words, the Court seemingly carved out 
a whistleblower, or altruistic, exception for tipping material non-public 
information.78 
The term “personal benefit,” however, is not sufficiently specific and is 
what has given rise to countless insider trading cases since Dirks. Justice 
Powell gives three examples of what would be considered personal benefits 
in the Dirks opinion: (1) “a pecuniary gain,” (2) “a reputational benefit that 
will translate into future earnings,”79 and (3) “when an insider makes a gift of 
confidential information to a trading relative or friend.”80 
C. Recent Challenges to Insider Trading Law 
After the Dirks opinion, liability for insider trading under the tipper-tippee 
theory requires the following elements to be present: (1) the tipper “has 
breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the [material 
non-public] information to the tippee,” (2) the tippee “knows or should know 
that there has been a breach,” (3) the tippee uses the information in 
connection with a securities transaction, and (4) the tipper obtained some 
personal benefit in return.81 These elements were created nearly out of whole 
cloth by common law, given that the statute underpinning insider trading 
liability does not mention the term “insider trading.”82 
Since Dirks, however, courts have taken a broad view of what can 
constitute a “personal benefit.” For example, “personal benefit” can be as 
 
76. Id. at 659–60. 
77. Id. at 666. 
78. Powell seems to have been motivated by over-zealous prosecution of insider trading and 
that having a detrimental effect on market efficiency. He also thought this would chill the 
incentives for analysts and other market professionals to uncover information about companies. 
See Pritchard, supra note 65; Pritchard, Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, supra 
note 48, at 931. Thus, in Powell’s mind, adequate price valuation is paramount, even if some 
analysts need to learn info about company from insiders. See generally Nagy, supra note 5, at 
1324–28 (arguing that this problem is better addressed through Reg FD and other measures). 
79. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663–64. 
80. Id. at 664; United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Dirks, 
463 U.S. at 664). 
81. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 647; see also SEC v. Ingram, 694 F. Supp. 1437, 1440 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 
1988). 
82. See supra Section I.A and accompanying notes. 
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minimal as maintaining network contacts or personal relationships.83 In 
recent years, courts, including the Supreme Court, have reexamined the Dirks 
standard without much clarification. Three recent cases spotlight the existing 
confusion and disagreement on the current state of insider trading law, and 
this Section addresses these three decisions in chronological order. 
1. United States v. Newman84 
In 2014, the Second Circuit again considered the concept of a personal 
benefit through the Dirks presumption of a gift to a “trading relative or friend” 
and established that relational distance is a key factor in determining who 
meets the definition of “friend.” The Newman case involved two long chains 
of tippers and tippees. Todd Newman and Anthony Chiasson were portfolio 
managers charged for trading based on material non-public information 
related to NVIDIA and Dell stock.85 For the NVIDIA tipping chain, a member 
of the NVIDIA finance unit disclosed material non-public information to an 
acquaintance, who eventually told a securities analyst.86 That particular 
analyst told another analyst, who then tipped Newman and Chiasson.87 A 
similar story occurred for the Dell tipping chain: a member of the Dell 
investor relations team disclosed information to Sandy Goyal, an analyst.88 
Goyal tipped another analyst who eventually tipped Newman and Chiasson. 
Newman and Chiasson traded on the information and generated “lavish 
profits for their respective funds.”89 
Applying the Dirks standard, the Second Circuit held that the government 
presented insufficient evidence to establish that either the NVIDIA or the 
Dell insider received a personal benefit for the tip.90 The court stated that 
while the personal benefit standard is “permissive,” it “does not suggest that 
the [g]overnment may prove the receipt of a personal benefit by the mere fact 
of a friendship, particularly of a casual or social nature.”91 Thus, the distance 
between the relationships among the tippers and tippees is what afforded 
Newman and Chiasson immunity from liability. 
 
83. See, e.g., SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003); SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 
68, 77 (1st Cir. 2000); SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 1995). 
84. 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014). 




89. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2015). 
90. Newman, 773 F.3d at 442. 
91. Id. at 452. 
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The Newman court, therefore, created two distinct limitations to the 
personal benefit test. The first was the relational distance. The court held that 
a personal benefit does not exist absent a “meaningfully close personal 
relationship.”92 Further, the court stated that the meaningfully close personal 
relationship must generate “an exchange that is objective, consequential, and 
represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable 
nature.”93 In this second limitation, the personal benefit test is seemingly 
swallowed by the pecuniary gain requirement. That is, according to Newman, 
a personal benefit through a close relationship will likely have a pecuniary 
gain element to it. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Newman but 
addressed this second limitation in its decision in Salman, detailed below. 
2. Salman v. United States94 
Although the Supreme Court declined to take up the Newman case to the 
surprise of many commentators,95 it did agree to hear a subsequent case on 
insider trading, Salman v. United States.96 In Salman, the defendant was 
convicted of insider trading, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction.97 
The facts of the case involved Maher Kara, who worked for Citigroup 
healthcare, informing his older brother, Michael Kara, about upcoming 
mergers and acquisitions of Citigroup clients.98 Michael Kara was engaged to 
 
92. Id. The Newman decision seemed to change the parameters of tipper-tippee liability, 
which had been additionally shaped by a 2012 civil case, SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 279 (2d 
Cir. 2012). In Obus, the Second Circuit interpreted the elements of tipper-tippee liability to allow 
for tippees to be found guilty even if they were unaware of the tipper’s benefit. Id. at 287–88. 
Newman “connect[ed] gift-giving and real benefit by demanding proof of a sufficiently close 
relationship between tipper and tippee” and required that the tippee have “actual knowledge of 
the breach and benefit.” Langevoort, supra note 28, at 4. 
93. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452. 
94. 137 S. Ct. 420, 424 (2016). 
95. See generally Donna M. Nagy, Salman v. United States: Insider Trading’s Tipping 
Point?, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 28 (2016), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/salman-
v-united-states-insider-tradings-tipping-point/ [https://perma.cc/24VN-349H]; A.C. Pritchard, 
The SEC, Administrative Usurpation, and Insider Trading, 69 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55 (2016), 
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/the-sec-administrative-usurpation-and-insider-
trading/ [https://perma.cc/RY43-UYKT]. 
96. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 420. 
97. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015). Interestingly, Judge 
Rakoff, who is a district judge in the Second Circuit, wrote the Ninth Circuit opinion because he 
was sitting by designation. Id. This was yet another interesting intersection between the Second 
and Ninth Circuits related to Newman and Salman. 
98. Id. at 1088–89. 
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Saswan Salman, the sister of the defendant, Bassam Salman.99 Michael Kara 
passed on the inside information he learned from Maher to Bassam Salman.100 
Salman traded on the information and netted over one million dollars from 
2004 to 2007 on trades based upon the material non-public information 
obtained from Michael.101 
At trial, the government presented evidence that Salman knew that Maher 
Kara was the source of the inside information.102 Included in the 
government’s evidence was proof that Michael told Maher he “owe[d] 
somebody,” yet Michael turned down the offer for money from Maher and 
instead took a tip about an upcoming acquisition.103 In other words, the tip of 
inside information was given in lieu of cash. 
Salman appealed his conviction based upon the decision in Newman, 
arguing that Maher did not receive any pecuniary gain from tipping.104 In an 
8-0 opinion, the Supreme Court held that the Dirks “personal benefit” test 
had been met because Salman was a “trading relative or friend” by virtue of 
being a brother-in-law of the insider.105 For this reason, the Court did not need 
to delve into the question of whether there was any pecuniary gain for the 
tipper, given the Dirks presumption of personal benefit through this type of 
relationship. 
Salman was an open-and-shut case that fell squarely within the definition 
of personal benefit as laid out in Dirks. In many ways, Salman did not alter 
anything about insider trading or clarify the law. The one takeaway from 
Salman that provided clarity to the confusion among the lower courts was the 
dicta that the relationship of a “trading relative or friend” does not need to 
include a pecuniary gain.106 In that way, the second limitation imposed by the 
Newman court—that the “meaningfully close personal relationship” must be 
accompanied by the potential for pecuniary gain—was squarely rejected.107 
 




103. Id. (alteration in original). 
104. Id. at 1088. 
105. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 422 (2016); see also Matthew C. Turk & Karen 
E. Woody, Leidos and the Roberts Court’s Improvident Securities Law Docket, 70 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 89 (2017), https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/leidos-and-the-roberts-courts-
improvident-securities-law-docket/ [https://perma.cc/Q5EG-RVG8] (arguing that the Roberts 
court had not issued many securities laws opinions that have moved the needle or elucidated 
complex concepts). 
106. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 422. 
107. Id. at 421–22. 
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3. United States v. Martoma108 
On the heels of the Salman decision, the Second Circuit again revisited the 
breadth of the personal benefit test through the “relational distance” 
limitation. In Martoma, the defendant Martoma managed an investment 
portfolio for the S.A.C. Capital Advisors, LLC (“SAC”).109 In that capacity, 
Martoma contacted doctors through an expert networking firm paid by 
SAC.110 One of the doctors, Dr. Gilman, provided Martoma with confidential 
updates on the safety of certain drugs and the results of clinical trials before 
they were made public.111 Martoma and SAC traded on the information, 
which resulted in approximately $80.3 million in gains and $194.6 million in 
averted losses.112 Martoma was convicted for insider trading but appealed 
based on the ruling in Newman.113 Martoma argued that he did not have a 
“meaningfully close personal relationship” with Dr. Gilman, the insider, nor 
had Dr. Gilman received any gain of pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.114 
The Martoma case, however, took an interesting twist. The Second Circuit 
affirmed the conviction for reasons detailed below but amended its decision 
nearly a year later.115 In the first opinion, “Martoma I,” the court held that the 
“logic of Salman” abrogated Newman’s “meaningfully close personal 
relationship” requirement.116 Essentially, the Martoma I court stated that 
because Salman did not address the “meaningfully close personal 
relationship” element due to the fact that the tipper-tippee relationship in 
Salman was one of brothers-in-law, the element was no longer a requirement 
for liability.117 Through some minor logical leaps, the Second Circuit decided 
that nearly any relationship would meet the standard of tipper-tippee for 
insider trading liability. In other words, Martoma I came very close to a 
reversion to the TGS standard; meaning, any person trading on inside 
information could be liable for insider trading. 
Understandably, the defense bar howled after the Martoma I ruling, and 
the stage seemed set for yet another cert petition on the elements of insider 
 
108. United States v. Martoma (Martoma I), 869 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 2017), amended and 
superseded by United States v. Martoma (Martoma II), 894 F.3d 64, 67–68 (2d Cir. 2018). 
109. Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 61. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 62. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 64. 
114. Id. at 64–65. 
115. Martoma II, 894 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir. 2018). 
116. Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 61. 
117. Id. at 69. 
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trading.118 Martoma himself appealed for a hearing en banc, and two high-
profile amici briefs were filed, one on behalf of the New York Council of 
Defense Lawyers, and the other by a group of prestigious law professors.119 
Combined, the amici represented a veritable “who’s who” of securities law 
academics and practitioners, all of whom cried foul on the over-extension of 
insider trading liability beyond the Dirks standard. As a result, the Second 
Circuit panel amended its decision nearly 10 months after its initial opinion 
(“Martoma II”).120 In the amended opinion, the court affirmed the conviction 
but on the grounds that Dr. Gilman had been handsomely paid for his 
consultations, meeting the “pecuniary gain” requirement for the personal 
benefit test.121 The court backed off its abrogation of the “meaningfully close 
personal relationship” test, seemingly with a recognition that such a 
precedent would overrule Dirks.122 
Martoma petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari and was 
denied in June 2019.123 Thus, the opportunity to provide parameters to the 
personal benefit test was avoided again this term. As described below, 
however, the parameters for insider trading as defined by recent court 
decisions may be wholly irrelevant. 
  
 
118. David Miller & Grant McQueen, Martoma—The Latest Critical Insider Trading 
Decision, LAW360 (June 27, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1057759/martoma-the-
latest-critical-insider-trading-decision [https://perma.cc/8GQ5-TMK7]. 
119. Brief for Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, United States v. 
Martoma, 894 F.3d 64 (2018) (No. 18-972), 2019 WL 991092, at *1; Brief for the New York 
Council of Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant’s Petition 
for Rehearing En Banc, United States v. Martoma, 894 F.3d 64 (2018) (No. 14-3599), 2018 WL 
4075999, at *1. 
120. Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 67–68. 
121. Id. at 79. 
122. Id. at 71. 
123. Martoma v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2665 (2019); Greg Stohr, Supreme Court Rejects 
Martoma, Won’t Curb Insider Trading Cases, BLOOMBERG (June 3, 2019, 6:33 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-03/supreme-court-rejects-martoma-won-t-
curb-insider-trading-cases [https://perma.cc/B5GH-TY4C]. 




Personal Benefit Test Summary 
 
Case Court Elements of Personal Benefit 
Test 
Dirks SCOTUS Powell’s three examples of a 
personal benefit: 
1. Pecuniary gain, OR 
2. Reputational gain, OR 
3. Presumption of benefit due 
to close friend or family 
member relationship 
Newman 2d Circuit 1. Relationship (Dirks’ #3) 
must be meaningful and 
close; AND 
2. Include pecuniary gain, 
essentially folding Dirks’ #3 
into Dirks’ #1. 
Salman SCOTUS Abrogates Newman’s holding 
that Dirks’ #3 (relationship 
presumption) also requires 
pecuniary gain. 
Martoma I 2d Circuit Reads Salman’s abrogation of 
Newman to mean that the 
relationship of Dirks’ #3 does 
not need to be close or 
meaningful. Any relationship 
will meet the Dirks’ #3 test. 
Martoma II 2d Circuit 
(reissuance; 
not en banc) 
Backtracks on previous holding 
that any relationship creates a 
presumption of personal benefit. 
Holding stands because court 
can find Dirks’ #1 (pecuniary 
gain) = harmless error. 
II. INSIDER TRADING UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 1348 
This Article posits that much time and attention has been, and will 
continue to be, paid to the necessary clarification of the personal benefit test, 
yet there is potentially another way to prosecute insider trading without 
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needing to prove the judicially created elements of the crime under Rule 10b-
5. While Rule 10b-5 establishes civil and criminal liability for securities 
fraud, enforced by the SEC and the DOJ respectively, Congress passed 
another securities fraud prohibition in 2002.124 The provision, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1348, is found in the criminal code, and therefore only the DOJ can avail 
itself of this charge.125 Section 1348, enacted as part of Sarbanes-Oxley, was 
modeled after the mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and § 1343, 
and states 
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or 
artifice– 
(1) To defraud any person in connection with any commodity 
for future delivery, or any option on a commodity for future 
delivery, or any security of an issuer with a class of 
securities registered under section 12 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, or that is required to file reports 
under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; 
or 
(2) To obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises, any money or property in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any commodity for 
future delivery, or any option on a commodity for future 
delivery, or any security of an issuer with a class of 
securities registered under section 12 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, or that is required to file reports 
under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; 
Shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than 25 years, 
or both.126 
The legislative history for this provision makes clear that Congress 
intended to “supplement the patchwork of existing technical securities law 
violations with a more general and less technical provision, with elements 
and intent requirements comparable to current bank and health care fraud 
statutes.”127 Senator Leahy explained that § 1348 was necessary because 
there is no generally accessible statute that deals with the specific 
problem of securities fraud. In these cases, federal investigators and 
 
124. 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2018). 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 14 (2002); 148 CONG. REC. S7420 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) 
(statement of Sen. Leahy). 
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prosecutors are forced either to resort to a patchwork of technical 
Title 15 offenses and regulations, which may criminalize particular 
violations of securities law, or to treat the cases as generic mail or 
wire fraud cases and to meet the technical elements of those statutes, 
with their five year maximum penalties.128 
Senator Leahy envisioned that § 1348 would “provide needed enforcement 
flexibility and, in the context of publicly traded companies, protection against 
all the types [of] schemes and frauds which inventive criminals may devise 
in the future.”129 
Section 1348’s language has marked similarities to that of Rule 10b-5, 
despite the legislative history suggesting that § 1348 should be a broader, 
more “flexible” prosecutorial tool than Title 15 and carry a weightier 
sentence than the mail and wire fraud statutes. Indeed, § 1348 carries a 
possible sentence of up to twenty-five years, which is higher than § 10(b).130 
Notably, as is the case with § 10(b), the language of § 1348 does not address 
insider trading directly. 
Moreover, the historical context of Sarbanes-Oxley should not be 
overlooked. Sarbanes-Oxley was inherently a reaction to the Enron scandal 
and the manipulation of energy markets that occurred as a result.131 
Commentators suggest that the Enron scandal, as well as that of Tyco and 
Adelphia, contributed to a falling economy and stock market, in addition to 
thousands of lost jobs.132 The size of the scandals and the growing sense that 
there were no corporate ramifications for the actions of greedy corporations 
and executives allowed for the bill to gain traction. Because of this, Sarbanes-
Oxley passed through Congress with a 99-0 vote in the Senate and a 423-3 
vote in the House of Representatives.133 
Importantly, there is far less precedent for the application and 
interpretation of § 1348 than for § 10(b), given that § 1348 was enacted just 
under twenty years ago. Yet whether § 1348 should be applied to insider 
 
128. 148 CONG. REC. S7420 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
129. Id. 
130. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2018) with 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (2018). 
131. See, e.g., Phillip Wesley Lambert, Worlds Are Colliding: A Critique of the Need for the 
Additional Criminal Securities Fraud Section in Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 839, 
841 (2003). 
132. Id. at 841 n.14 (noting that Sen. Levin’s statement made clear that only corporate 
executives “escaped with millions of dollars” but that most of American households felt the 
effects of the scandals) (citing 148 CONG. REC. S10,563 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2002) (statement of 
Sen. Levin)). 
133. Lambert, supra note 131, at 841. 
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trading cases has been the source of recent debate, and only a few cases have 
addressed this. 
A. Conviction Under § 1348 and Acquittal Under § 10(b): United 
States v. Blaszczak134 
In United States v. Blaszczak, the Second Circuit was faced with 
delineating securities fraud under § 10(b) and § 1348. The facts of the case 
are as follows. Blaszczak obtained material non-public information from 
Christopher Worrall, a government employee at the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS).135 CMS is responsible for setting the Medicare 
reimbursement rates for healthcare providers.136 Blaszczak was a former 
employee of CMS and met Worrall in that capacity.137 According to the 
indictment, from 2009 to 2014, Worrall informed Blaszczak about upcoming 
CMS reimbursement cuts for particular radiation treatments and dialysis 
treatments.138 Blaszczak relayed the information to Robert Olan and 
Theodore Huber, both employees of Deerfield Management Company L.P., 
a healthcare-focused hedge fund.139 Olan and Huber shorted stocks that would 
be affected by the changes in reimbursement policy.140 According to the 
government, Deerfield “reaped more than $7 million in profits” as a result of 
the trades.141 
The government charged defendants with violations of securities fraud 
under both Rule 10b-5 and § 1348, conversion of government property under 
18 U.S.C. § 641, wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and conspiracy to 
commit securities fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 371.142 After a month-long jury 
trial in May 2018, Worrall was convicted of wire fraud and conversion of 
government property but was acquitted of securities fraud under both Rule 
10b-5 and § 1348.143 The traders Olan and Huber were found guilty of 
securities fraud under § 1348 but were acquitted of securities fraud under 
 
134. 947 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 2019). 




139. Id. at 26. 
140. Id. at 27. 
141. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Four Defendants Sentenced Following Convictions at 
Trial for Stealing Confidential Government Information and Using It To Engage in Illegal Trading 
(Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/four-defendants-sentenced-following-
convictions-trial-stealing-confidential-government [https://perma.cc/J7JW-ZJ3T]. 
142. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 46 (Kearse, J., dissenting). 
143. See id. at 29–30 (majority opinion). 
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Rule 10b-5.144 Similarly, Blaszczak, who was the “middle man” or 
intermediate tippee, was acquitted of securities fraud under Rule 10b-5 but 
found guilty under § 1348.145 In other words, the jury awarded convictions 
for securities fraud only under § 1348 and not Rule 10b-5, despite the charges 
emanating from the same set of facts and activity. 
The explanation of the convictions at the district court in Blaszczak lies in 
the potentially problematic jury instructions. The jury instructions for Rule 
10b-5 consisted of nearly twenty pages of transcript and required the jury to 
address ten specific issues related to whether the defendants had a duty of 
trust and confidence to CMS, whether there was a personal benefit granted in 
the exchange of information, and whether the tippees knew of that personal 
benefit.146 In short, if the jury answered “no” to any of the questions related 
to the elements of Rule 10b-5, it would acquit the defendants on that 
charge.147 In contrast, the jury instructions related to § 1348 were more sparse 
and consisted of only four pages of the transcript.148 The government only 
needed to show that there was a “scheme or artifice to defraud,” intent to 
defraud, and a connection to the purchase or sale of a security.149 
The defendants appealed on several grounds, including that the district 
court erred by not instructing the jury that the Dirks personal benefit test 
applied to the wire fraud and § 1348 fraud counts.150 On December 30, 2019, 
 
144. See id. 
145. See id. 
146. Id. at 29; Antonia M. Apps & Katherine R. Goldstein, Can the Government Circumvent 
“Newman’s” Personal Benefit Test?, 262 N.Y. L.J. 1, 2 (2019), 
https://www.milbank.com/images/content/1/2/v2/126268/NYLJ-12.02.2019-Milbank.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2TY6-3PDE]. 
147. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors at 3–5, United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19 
(2d Cir. 2019) (No. 18-2811, 18-2825, 18-2867, 18-2878), 2019 WL 1200033. 
 148. Elkan Abramowitz & Jonathan S. Sack, Back to the Future: Criminal Insider Trading 






 150. One of the other grounds for appeal involved the question of whether the CMS’s 
confidential information constituted “property” that was a “thing of value.” The dissent by Judge 
Kearse focused on this point in its disagreement with the majority. Specifically, Judge Kearse 
agreed with defendants that the convictions should be vacated because the information on which 
defendants traded involved government reimbursement rates for certain medical treatments. 
Kearse underscored that CMS is a regulatory agency, and that is distinguishable from Carpenter, 
upon which the majority relied. Kearse wrote that premature disclosure of CMS’s pre-decisional 
regulatory information did not render CMS a victim or “deprived of anything that could be 
considered property.” Blaszczak, 947 F.3d at 46–47 (Kearse, J., dissenting). 
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the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s convictions, focusing its 
reasoning on the embezzlement, or misappropriation, theory. Citing 
O’Hagan, the court stated “[t]he undisclosed misappropriation of 
confidential information, in breach of a fiduciary duty or similar duty of trust 
and confidence, ‘constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement.’”151 
The Second Circuit went further, however, in stating that the Dirks 
personal benefit test is “judge-made doctrine premised on the Exchange Act’s 
statutory purpose” which, the Second Circuit declared, differs from the 
purpose of § 1348.152 Section 1348 was “intended to provide prosecutors with 
a different—and broader—enforcement mechanism to address securities 
fraud than what had been previously provided in the Title 15 fraud 
provisions.”153 
What the Second Circuit misses is that insider trading is not civil securities 
fraud unless it meets the elements of the Dirks personal benefit test. To hold 
that it is criminal fraud under § 1348 creates a panoply of issues, discussed 
in Part V. Defendants addressed this issue in their appeal, and the Second 
Circuit dismissed this policy argument by stating that “[t]he Federal Criminal 
Code is replete with provisions that criminalize overlapping conduct” and 
that “Congress was certainly authorized to enact a broader securities fraud 
provision.”154 
The Blaszczak case represents one of the first instances wherein a jury 
convicted a defendant of insider trading under § 1348 but declined to convict 
under Rule 10b-5. The Second Circuit’s affirmance of that decision 
represents a marked shift in insider trading doctrine and is one of the only 
cases to have considered whether insider trading violates § 1348. The only 
other recent cases arose from the Northern District of Georgia and are 
described below. 
B. Insider Trading Charged Only Under § 1348 
As noted above, there have been scant prosecutions for insider trading 
under § 1348. One particular federal court, the Northern District of Georgia, 
has heard two, and both cases charged violations of only § 1348 and not § 
10(b). 
 
 151. Id. at 28 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997)) (majority opinion). 
 152. Id. at 35–36. 
 153. Id. at 36–37. 
 154. Id. at 37. 
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1. United States v. Slawson155 
Slawson was the co-founder of Titan Capital Management, an investment 
company that managed assets of TCMP3 Partners, L.P., a hedge fund.156 In 
2014, a federal grand jury indicted Slawson on thirty-six counts, including § 
1343 (wire fraud), § 1348, and § 1349 (conspiracy).157 The prosecutors opted 
not to charge securities fraud under Rule 10b-5.158 The indictment alleged that 
Slawson was the recipient of inside information about the children’s clothing 
company, Carter’s Inc.159 Specifically, Slawson received material non-public 
information about quarterly and annual earnings for Carter’s Inc. from a 
retired analyst, who himself had received the information from two insiders 
at Carter’s.160 Slawson then traded on the information.161 The indictment 
alleged the insiders disclosed the information in violation of fiduciary duties, 
expectations of confidentiality, Carter’s written policies, and agreements to 
maintain confidentiality.162 
For the § 1348 charge, the indictment alleged that Slawson knowingly and 
willfully executed and attempted to execute a “scheme . . . to defraud others 
in connection with Carter’s Inc. stock securities and . . . to obtain by false and 
fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises, money and property in 
connection with the purchase and sale of [those] securities” through 
misappropriated information.163 The indictment further alleged that Slawson 
knew that the information had been disclosed in violation of fiduciary 
duties.164 
Slawson moved to dismiss the indictment for failing to allege an essential 
element of the crimes charged.165 Specifically, Slawson argued that the 
indictment failed to allege that he knew that either of the alleged insider 
tippers received any personal benefit in connection with passing along 
material non-public information.166 In other words, Slawson, a remote tippee, 
hewed to the definition of tipper-tippee insider trading outlined in Dirks. In 
 
155. No. 1:14–CR–00186–RWS–JFK, 2014 WL 5804191 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 7, 2014). 
156. Id. at *1. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at *10. 
159. Id. at *2. 
160. Id. at *1–2. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at *2. 
163. Id. at *1. 
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response, the government argued that Slawson was not charged with 
violations of § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.167 
The magistrate judge agreed with the government, holding that the 
indictment properly presented the essential elements of the charges.168 The 
court noted that Slawson relied on statutes, regulations, and case law 
interpreting § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, yet Slawson failed to offer “a single legal 
authority applying that case law to the Title 18 securities fraud violations 
alleged in th[e] indictment.”169 For that reason, the magistrate held that there 
was no reason to import the definitions of tipper-tippee insider trading as 
litigated under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 into a case wherein only § 1348 
securities fraud had been charged.170 The magistrate judge’s Report and 
Recommendation was later approved and adopted as the opinion of the trial 
court.171 
2. United States v. Melvin172 
The Melvin case builds upon Slawson and involved another instance 
wherein prosecutors charged insider trading under § 1348 but declined to 
charge violations of § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. Like Slawson, the Melvin court 
involved a report and recommendation from a magistrate judge in the 
Northern District of Georgia;173 that report was then reviewed by the district 
court judge.174 Melvin was a CPA in Georgia, and his codefendants, Berry, 
Cain, and Jinks, were clients and friends.175 Melvin also provided accounting 
services to one of the board members of Chattem, Inc., an over-the-counter 
 
167. Id. at *4. 
168. Id. at *8. 
169. Id. at *6. The court in a later section of its opinion, denying Slawson’s motion for a bill 
of particulars, reiterated this sentiment:  
Again, Defendant relies primarily on case law involving allegations of 
wrongdoing pursuant to the Security Exchange Act, from outside this district, 
to argue that the information he seeks is necessary for an ‘insider trading case.’ 
Defendant’s arguments are undermined by his continued misplaced reliance 
on decisions addressing charges and based on statutes and regulations not at 
issue in this case. 
Id. at *11 (internal citations omitted). 
170. Id. at *6–7. 
171. Id. at *20. 
172. 143 F. Supp. 3d 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2015). 
173. United States v. Melvin, No. 3:14–cr–00022–TCB–RGV, 2015 WL 7116737, at *1 
(N.D. Ga. May 27, 2015). 
174. Melvin, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 1360. 
175. Id. at 1360–61. 
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pharmaceutical manufacturer.176 Chattem entered discussions with Sanofi-
Aventis, a large French pharmaceutical company, about a potential 
acquisition.177 Melvin learned of the upcoming acquisition through his 
interactions with the board member of Chattem and then disclosed the 
information to the codefendants.178 
Melvin moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to allege a crime, 
among other reasons.179 Melvin and his codefendants argued that the 
indictment failed to allege that Melvin received a personal benefit from the 
disclosure of information, as required by the insider trading jurisprudence 
under Rule 10b-5.180 The magistrate judge, relying upon Slawson, “decline[d] 
to impose on the charges set forth in the indictment the requirement to plead 
elements of offenses not charged in the indictment.”181 The district court 
judge affirmed, noting that defendants “ha[d] not offered any authority that 
expressly indicates the elements required to prove an insider trading violation 
under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 should be imported into § 1348.”182 Moreover, 
the district judge underscored that the purpose of § 1348 was to “broaden the 
range of conduct proscribed by existing federal securities laws” and that the 
statute “was modeled on the mail and wire fraud statutes, not on the Exchange 
Act.”183 
Despite the court’s clear language refusing to consider the elements of § 
10(b) in a § 1348 case, the district court, unnecessarily, went on to state that 
the indictment likely would not fail even if the court incorporated the 
elements of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.184 The court relied upon the O’Hagan 
misappropriation theory185 to discredit defendants’ argument that the Chattem 
board member, not Melvin, was the actual tipper.186 Then the court waded 
further into a discussion of Rule 10b-5 elements when addressing defendants’ 
reliance upon Newman and the failure of the indictment to allege any personal 
 
176. Id. at 1361. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. United States v. Melvin, No. 3:14–cr–00022–TCB–RGV, 2015 WL 7116737, at *1, *8 
(N.D. Ga. May 27, 2015). 
180. Id. at *8. 
181. Id. at *9 (quoting United States v. Slawson, No. 1:14–CR–00186–RWS–JFK, 2014 WL 
5804191, at *7 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 7, 2014)). 
182. Melvin, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 1374. 
183. Id. at 1375 (internal citation omitted). 
184. Id. 
185. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (holding that the 
misappropriation theory applies where an individual misappropriates confidential information for 
the purpose of trading in a security in violation of a duty owed to the source of the information). 
186. Melvin, 143 F. Supp. 3d at 1375. 
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benefit.187 The court shrugged off Newman as “not binding authority” and 
stated that it would use the Dirks definition of a benefit, which can include 
enhancement of one’s reputation or a gift to a trading relative or friend.188 
Thus, despite holding that the elements of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are 
irrelevant to charges brought under § 1348, the court nevertheless undertook 
the intellectual exercise of grappling with the definitions of insider trading as 
elucidated under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 
These cases represent the bare landscape of cases in which insider trading 
charges were brought under § 1348 rather than Rule 10b-5, and the court in 
both instances made clear that importation of Rule 10b-5 elements into § 
1348 interpretation was inappropriate. 
III. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN § 1348 AND RULE 10B-5 
The Blaszczak case brings up a few distinct issues with respect to the 
intersection between § 1348 and Rule 10b-5. The first is one of double-
charging, or multiplicity of charges. The second involves the connection 
between Rule 10b-5 charges for insider trading and mail and wire fraud 
charges for insider trading. Finally, and likely most significant, is whether the 
Blaszczak court erred by not importing definitions and principles specific and 
unique to insider trading that have been fleshed out in Rule 10b-5 
jurisprudence. This Part addresses these matters in turn. 
A. Multiplicity of Charges 
The Blaszczak case involved charges of both §§ 1348 and 10(b), but the 
jury only convicted the defendants on violations of § 1348. This is a marked 
difference from the two Georgia cases listed above, Slawson and Melvin, 
which did not include a § 10(b) charge at all.189 In the case of Blaszczak, 
where prosecutors charge Rule 10b-5 criminally, as well as § 1348, there is a 
potential risk of multiplicity of charges; that is, charging a defendant under 
different statutes for the exact same conduct, without an additional fact. 
 
187. Id. at 1376. 
188. Id. 
189. Although the Slawson case did not involve a criminal Rule 10b-5 charge, Slawson also 
raised the issue of double jeopardy in relation to the SEC’s attendant civil suit that followed on 
the heels of his criminal conviction. Slawson’s argument failed because there is no double 
jeopardy risk when one of the matters is a civil action. Double jeopardy only applies to multiple 
criminal actions. That said, it is true that a Rule 10b-5 case can be brought as either a civil or 
criminal action. For this reason, Slawson’s argument ultimately failed. See infra notes 183–93 
regarding double jeopardy issues at play between § 10(b) and § 1348 charges. 
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Another recent case out of the Northern District of Georgia addressed this 
very issue. In United States v. Ying, the government charged Ying with both 
§ 1348 and § 10(b) violations in relation to trades in Equifax.190 Ying’s case 
was one of classical insider trading, not tipper-tippee. In his motion to 
dismiss, Ying raised the issue that his indictment was multiplicitous because 
it charged Ying with the same offense in two separate counts, in violation of 
the Blockburger rule.191 Citing Blockburger, the court stated that the test 
establishes that each provision or count requires proof of a fact that the other 
does not.192 The district court affirmed the magistrate’s ruling on the motion 
to dismiss, noting that the magistrate had determined that a violation of 
§ 10(b) requires proof of willfulness, whereas a violation of § 1348 does 
not.193 
In appealing the magistrate ruling, Ying relied upon an Eleventh Circuit 
case that stated that a conviction for aiding and abetting bank fraud requires 
“the same willfulness and unlawful intent as the actual perpetrators of the 
fraud” to show that willfulness is required for the sister provisions § 1348, 
including mail, wire, and bank fraud.194 Adopting somewhat circular 
reasoning, the court rejected Ying’s argument, stating that Ying had cited no 
legal authority that “finds that § 1348 does require proof of willfulness.”195 
Moreover, the court explained, the precedent upon which Ying relied did not 
 
190. No. 1:18-CR-74-AT, 2018 WL 6322308, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 4, 2018). The Ying case 
is most interesting in light of another issue that is beyond the scope of this paper but that I will 
briefly describe here. Ying was an employee of Equifax who was never told about the Equifax 
data breach. Rather, Equifax had explicitly lied to Ying and told him that the data breach he was 
working on was for an Equifax client. As Ying, Chief Information Officer, was working on the 
hypothetical breach, he allegedly “put 2 and 2 together” and sold his stock prior to the public 
announcement of the data breach, thereby avoiding losses of over $117,000. This case marks one 
of the only times the government has moved forward on an insider trading charge with the theory 
of “constructive knowledge” imputed to an insider, and that knowledge being the basis of the 
insider trading charge. Daniel A. Goldfried, Does United States v. Ying Expand the Knowledge 




191. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 303–04 (1932) (establishing a test to 
determine whether two statutory provisions prohibit the same conduct, which would violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause); Ying, 2018 WL 6322308, at *6. See generally Abram Olchyk, A Spoof 
of Justice: Double Jeopardy Implications for Convictions of Both Spoofing and Commodities 
Fraud for the Same Transaction, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 239, 245 (2015). 
192. Ying, 2018 WL 6322308, at *6. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. (quoting United States v. Teers, 591 F. App’x. 824, 843 (11th Cir. 2014)). 
195. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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involve a charge under § 1348.196 Ultimately, the court held that the lack of 
the word “willful” in the plain language of § 1348 stands in direct contrast to 
the presence of the word “willful” in § 10(b).197 That difference, according to 
the court, was enough to render § 1348 and § 10(b) different charges for 
purposes of the Blockburger test. 
In Ying, the magistrate judge relied upon another unreported case that 
highlighted that criminal liability requires a showing of willfulness under 
Rule 10b-5 but not under § 1348.198 Indeed, the Ying interpretation of the 
overlap between § 1348 and § 10(b) has some followers. Two former acting 
chiefs of the DOJ Fraud Division penned an article in October 2018 lauding 
§ 1348 as “a workhorse statute for prosecutors.”199 In that article, they 
highlight that one of the differences and benefits for charging § 1348 is that 
the mens rea requirement “appears to be lower” than a criminal violation of 
Rule 10b-5 because § 1348 merely requires that a defendant act “knowingly,” 
whereas Rule 10b-5 prosecutions require proof of willfulness.200 The 
fraudulent intent required for § 1348 prosecutions, like mail and wire fraud 
prosecutions, “may be inferred from the scheme itself.”201 
While the issue of multiplicity of charges seems to be settled by the plain 
reading of the statutes, congressional intent, and language from a few—albeit 
unreported—cases, the issue that repeatedly comes to the fore is when courts 
should look to definitions and interpretations of securities fraud under § 10(b) 





198. Id. (citing United States v. Hussain, No. 16-cr-00462-CRB-1, 2017 WL 4865562, at *8 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2017)). 
199. See Moser & Weitz, supra note 21, at 111. 
200. Id. at 121 (citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 136–37 (1994) (noting that “the 
willfulness requirement mandates something more . . . ‘the Government must prove that the 
defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful’”)). Moser and Weitz suggest that 
this difference in mens rea requirements is consistent with the congressional intent of § 1348. Id. 
at 121 n.32 (citing COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, THE CORPORATE AND CRIMINAL FRAUD 
ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2002, S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 6 (2002) (“[P]rosecutors may charge a 
willful violation of certain specific securities laws or regulations, but such regulations often 
contain technical legal requirements, and proving willful violations of these complex regulations 
allows defendants to argue that they did not possess the requisite criminal intent. There is no 
logical reason for imposing such awkward and heightened burdens on the prosecution of criminal 
securities fraud cases.” (quoting S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 6 (2002))). 
201. Id. (quoting United States v. Motz, 652 F. Supp. 2d 284, 296 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)). 
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B. Elephants in the Room: Mail and Wire Fraud Charges for Insider 
Trading and the Misappropriation Theory 
There is a viable argument that the potential end-around of § 10(b) insider 
trading via § 1348 is not a novel strategy.202 Prosecutors have long been able 
to charge insider trading under mail and wire fraud, §§ 1341, 1343, upon 
which § 1348 was modeled.203 The following discussion addresses the 
instances wherein courts have allowed liability for mail and wire fraud in 
conjunction with Rule 10b-5 charges for insider trading, premised upon the 
misappropriation theory. 
 
202. William K.S. Wang, Application of the Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes to 
Criminal Liability for Stock Market Insider Trading and Tipping, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 220, 234 
(2015). 
203. Id. at 227 n.16. (listing the number of cases charging insider trading in conjunction with 
mail and wire fraud charges). The text of the mail and wire fraud statutes is, unsurprisingly, 
markedly similar to that of § 1348. Section 1341 states, 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to 
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, 
alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any 
counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything 
represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious 
article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so 
to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any 
matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or 
deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or 
delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives 
therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by 
mail or such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which 
it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such 
matter or thing, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 
years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018). 
Similarly, the text for § 1343 states: 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to 
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted 
by means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign 
commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of 
executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
not more than 20 years, or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2018). 
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1. Carpenter v. United States 
The 1987 Supreme Court case of Carpenter v. United States is one of the 
most significant cases wherein mail and wire fraud charges were brought, 
along with § 10(b) charges, for insider trading activity.204 In Carpenter, one 
of the defendants was a reporter for the Journal who regularly interviewed 
corporate executives in order to write summaries about various stocks in a 
column called “Heard on the Street.”205 None of the information in the 
Journal articles contained inside information, but the “Heard on the Street” 
column had the potential to affect the price of the stocks that it discussed.206 
At issue in Carpenter was the fact that the information in “Heard on the 
Street” was the Journal’s confidential information.207 The defendants entered 
into a scheme to trade on the information that would be “Heard on the Street” 
prior to publication and netted profits of nearly $690,000.208 
The defendants argued that they had not engaged in a scheme to defraud, 
nor had they obtained any money or property from the Journal, as is required 
under the mail and wire fraud statutes.209 Further, the defendants argued that 
the Journal did not have any interest in the securities that were traded; that 
is, the Journal was not a buyer or seller of the stocks.210 Thus, defendants 
argued that § 10(b) should not apply because the Journal was only the alleged 
victim of a fraud and therefore could not meet the element that this activity 
was “in connection with a purchase or sale of securities.”211 The district court 
found that the breach of confidentiality by the author of “Heard on the Street” 
by misappropriating prepublication information was sufficient to constitute a 
breach of § 10(b).212 The Second Circuit affirmed.213 Likewise, the Second 
Circuit also affirmed the mail and wire convictions based upon the 
misappropriated property interest in the information, which fell within the 
elements of the mail and wire statutes.214 
 
204. 484 U.S. 19, 21–22 (1987). 
205. Id. at 22. 
206. Id. at 27–28. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 23. 
209. Id. at 25. Defendants relied upon the holding in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 
360 (1987), which established that the mail fraud statute is limited to the protection of property 
rights, not intangible rights. 
210. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24. 
211. Id. at 22–24. 
212. Id. at 25–26. 
213. Id. at 22–24. 
214. Id. 
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The Supreme Court was evenly split on the decision regarding the § 10(b) 
charges215 and therefore affirmed the Second Circuit’s holding that found the 
defendants liable for insider trading under § 10(b).216 Interestingly, despite 
being evenly split on the § 10(b) charges, the Court was unanimous in 
upholding the convictions for mail and wire fraud. Specifically, the Court 
affirmed the Second Circuit’s opinion that the Journal’s confidential business 
information was the property of the Journal.217 The Court stated that a scheme 
to defraud does not require monetary loss; rather, it “is sufficient that the 
Journal has been deprived of its right to exclusive use of the information, for 
exclusivity is an important aspect of confidential business information.”218 
The Carpenter case and its progeny tees up a question about the necessity 
for § 1348. Meaning, securities fraud would fall under mail and wire fraud 
whenever the defendant used either the mail or the wires; therefore, how is 
§ 1348 not always superfluous? The answer perhaps lies in the plain reading 
of the statutes. Section 1348 prohibits securities fraud by requiring the fraud 
to be linked to the sale of a security. In addition, the statute of limitations is 
different for § 1348 than it is for §§ 1341 and 1343.219 
Despite the outcome of Carpenter and the high-profile victory for the 
government in charging mail and wire fraud for insider trading, there have 
been a number of notable insider trading cases that did not include additional 
charges of mail and wire fraud.220 Among those are both the Newman and 
Martoma cases.221 More interestingly, another high-profile defendant, Raj 
Rajaratnam, was never charged with any Title 18 offenses, despite having a 
 
 215. The court was split 4-4 because Justice Powell, who argued to grant certiorari in order 
to reject the misappropriation theory, retired before the case was argued. Interestingly, Powell 
had written at the cert stage that Carpenter’s conduct was not illegal because there was no duty of 
trust or confidence between the parties to the transaction in Carpenter. See Fair to All People: 
the SEC and the Regulation of Insider Trading, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION HIST. SOC’Y, 
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it/counterAttack_d.php [https://perma.cc/464A-
5BC5]. 
216. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24. 
217. Id. at 26 (citing Ruckelshuas v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1001–04 (1984); Dirks v. SEC, 
463 U.S. 646, 653 (1983); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250–
51 (1905) (for the principle that confidential business information is recognized as property)). 
218. Id. at 26–27. Carpenter paved the way for the property-rights theory of 
misappropriation, which was ensconced in the law in United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 
677–78 (1997). Because the Carpenter court was split 4-4, thereby affirming the Second Circuit 
through inertia, the O’Hagan case cemented the misappropriation theory in 1997. 
219. Moser & Weitz, supra note 21, at 122. 
220. See Abramowitz & Sack, supra note 148 (listing recent high-profile insider trading cases 
that did not include a Title 18 charge, such as United States v. Rajaratnam, United States v. Goffer, 
United States v. Gupta, United States v. Newman, United States v. Martoma). 
221. Id. 
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judge order a wiretap and electronic surveillance based on predicate Title 18 
offenses, including mail fraud and money laundering.222 
A broader question is whether the Carpenter decision is correct in its 
seemingly bifurcated definition of fraud. The Court rendered a unanimous 
decision that Carpenter was guilty of mail and wire fraud, while punting on 
whether he was guilty of securities fraud. In other words, according to the 
Carpenter Court, “fraud” under the mail and wire statute did not mean the 
same thing as it did under § 10(b). Notably, Powell’s absence on the Court 
was the reason that the Second Circuit’s conviction for § 10(b) was upheld 
due to a divided court, yet we know from Powell’s cert opinion that he was 
against the imposition of § 10(b) liability for Carpenter.223 
2. United States v. O’Hagan 
The somewhat shaky theory decided by a split court underlying the insider 
trading conviction in Carpenter was further ensconced in the law through the 
O’Hagan decision in 1997.224 O’Hagan was a partner at Dorsey & Whitney 
law firm.225 Dorsey & Whitney represented Grand Metropolitan PLC (Grand 
Met) in Grand Met’s tender offer for the common stock of Pillsbury 
Company.226 O’Hagan was not involved in the Grand Met takeover 
representation but learned of it through conversations with a Dorsey & 
Whitney partner handling the representation.227 O’Hagan then purchased 
stock in the target company, Pillsbury, prior to the announcement of the 
tender offer and made a profit of over $4.3 million.228 Under these facts, 
O’Hagan was not an insider of the company in which he traded, nor did he 
owe Pillsbury or its shareholder a duty of trust or confidence. For this reason, 
the classical theory of insider trading under Chiarella and Dirks would not 
have supported prosecution for insider trading.229 
 
222. Id. (citing United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09-Cr-1184, 2010 WL 4867402, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2010) (denying the defense’s motion to suppress the evidence gained from 
the wiretap)). 
 223. See Fair to All People: the SEC and the Regulation of Insider Trading, supra note 215; 
see also Pritchard, supra note 7, at 58. 
 224. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 646–47 (1997). 
 225. Id. at 647. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 648 n.1. 
 228. Id. at 648. 
 229. See Donna Nagy, Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, 42 J. CORP. 
L. 1, 18 (2016). 
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Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, upheld O’Hagan’s conviction 
for insider trading under the misappropriation, or embezzlement, theory that 
O’Hagan breached a duty of loyalty to the source of the information (his law 
firm) in connection with a purchase or sale of a security.230 Justice Ginsburg 
underscored that the “fraud on the source” theory was in line with the purpose 
of securities laws to promote investor confidence and ensure honest securities 
markets.231 In doing so, Justice Ginsburg moved away from the Powell 
jurisprudence and seemingly back to a general fairness principle detailed in 
the pre-Chiarella opinions.232 
O’Hagan was not a tipper-tippee case but instead was an “outsider” 
trading case because O’Hagan did not have any relation to the company in 
whose stock he traded. Professor Donna Nagy points out that the O’Hagan 
logic can be extended to include tippers as misappropriators.233 However, for 
tippees, the government must prove the breach of a duty to the owner of the 
misappropriated information by the tipper, and the knowledge that the tipper 
had breached that duty.234 
Three Justices dissented in O’Hagan. Interestingly, Justice Scalia 
suggested that the rule of lenity should apply § 10(b) to require the 
manipulation or deception of a party to the securities transaction.235 Justice 
Thomas, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in dissent, argued that 
the fraud on the source was not sufficiently linked to the securities 
transaction. In other words, Justice Thomas wrote that even the government 
conceded that had O’Hagan merely stole funds with which he bought stock, 
rather than information, there would not be a sufficient nexus to show a 
violation of § 10(b)’s requirement of “in connection with the sale or purchase 
of a security.”236 
Most importantly for purposes of this paper, however, is Justice Thomas’s 
final two paragraphs in dissent, in which he states, “With regard to 
respondent’s convictions on the mail fraud counts, my view is that they may 
be sustained regardless of whether respondent may be convicted of the 
 
 230. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653. 
 231. Id. at 658. 
 232. Id.; Nagy, supra note 229, at 19; see also Bainbridge, supra note 6, at 1648 (suggesting 
that O’Hagan represents a reversion to the “equal access” theory of insider trading). 
 233. Nagy, supra note 229, at 20. 
 234. Id. (citing United States v. Falcone, 257 F.3d 226, 234 (2d Cir. 2001)). Justice 
Sotomayor authored this opinion when she was a member of the Second Circuit. 
 235. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 679 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also 
infra Part IV.C. (discussing the application of the rule of lenity). 
 236. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 681–82 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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securities fraud counts.”237 Thomas then states that he does not see much 
factual difference between O’Hagan and Carpenter on that point and would 
have held that it is not problematic that the mail fraud and securities fraud 
counts are predicated on the same factual basis.238 Herein lies a potential 
issue. “Fraud” under § 10(b), in Justice Thomas’s mind, did not exist in 
O’Hagan. Fraud under § 1343, however, did. Arguably, had the government 
charged § 1348 (had it existed at the time of O’Hagan), it follows that 
Thomas and his other dissenters may have held O’Hagan guilty for general 
securities fraud under that statute. 
C. Importing § 10(b) Jurisprudence into § 1348 Caselaw 
As discussed in Part II, the Blaszczak, Slawson and Melvin cases represent 
the first cases wherein a court considered whether the elements of § 10(b) 
should be applied to § 1348 charges.239 In all of those cases, the court held 
that there was no reason to consider elements outside of those required for 
the charge of securities fraud under § 1348. Three other cases suggest some 
overlap of § 10(b) and § 1348 may occur. These cases do not involve insider 
trading but are informative examples of when courts have borrowed from 
§ 10(b), or mail, wire, or honest services fraud found in Title 18, in 
interpreting § 1348. 
1. United States v. Hussain240 
Sushovan Hussain was the chief financial officer for Autonomy 
Corporation plc, a British software company bought by Hewlett-Packard 
(“HP”) for $11 billion in 2011.241 Within a year of the acquisition, HP alleged 
that Autonomy had committed accounting fraud and had “cooked the books” 
prior to the acquisition, resulting in HP writing off $8.8 billion.242 Hussain 
was charged with fourteen counts of wire fraud, § 1343, one count of 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, § 1349, and one count of securities fraud, 
§ 1348.243 Hussain moved to dismiss the indictment on a number of grounds, 
 
 237. Id. at 700. 
 238. Id. at 700–01 (“[J]ust because those facts are legally insufficient to constitute securities 
fraud does not make them legally insufficient to constitute mail fraud.”). 
239. See supra Part II and accompanying notes. 
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including improper extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, but significant 
for this Article was Hussain’s argument that the misrepresentations related to 
Autonomy’s financial condition were “too remote from any purchase or sale 
of HP securities to satisfy the requirement that the fraud be ‘in connection 
with . . . any security.’”244 
Importantly, the district court for the Northern District of California stated, 
“There are few decisions interpreting this requirement. However, Hussain 
and the government agree that courts should look to the securities fraud 
provision of the Exchange Act in construing § 1348.”245 In doing so, the court 
noted that the “in connection with” language of § 1348 is “meant to reach at 
least as much conduct as the Exchange Act’s similar requirement.”246 
Next, the court turned to the legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley in order 
to assist its interpretation of § 1348247 and quoted Senator Leahy’s comment 
that § 1348 was “intended to provide needed enforcement flexibility in the 
context of publicly traded companies to protect shareholders and prospective 
shareholders against all the types of schemes and frauds which inventive 
criminals may devise in the future.”248 The court noted that § 1348 provides 
“broad-textured language” to assist in prosecuting securities fraud “while 
foregoing the Exchange Act’s requirement that it first specify particular 
violations through rulemaking . . . . Accordingly, the Court looks to cases 
decided under Exchange Act § 10(b) and the rules passed under that statute 
in construing the nexus to securities required under 18 U.S.C. § 1348.”249 
The Hussain court proceeded to list the elements a plaintiff must prove in 
order to recover damages under § 10(b) in a private right of action: (1) 
material misrepresentation or omission by defendant; (2) scienter; (3) 
connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or 
sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) 
economic loss; and (6) loss causation.250 The court noted that the government 
in a criminal matter does not need to prove reliance “because ‘reliance is 
relevant only to the identification of the private persons entitled to bring 
 
244. Id. at *6 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2018)). 
245. Id. 
246. Id. at *6–7 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78ff (2018) (noting that the Exchange Act’s 
language is “in connection with the purchase or sale of securities”) (emphasis added)). 
247. Id. at *7 (citing 148 CONG. REC. S7418, S7419–20 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement 
of Sen. Leahy)). 
248. Id. at *7. 
249. Id. (citing 148 CONG. REC. S7418, S7420–21 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of 
Sen. Leahy)). 
250. Id. (citing Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014)). 
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suit.’”251 Likewise, the government does not need to establish loss because 
there is no issue of standing in a criminal matter and because the purpose of 
a criminal prosecution is deterrence rather than compensation.252 While 
acknowledging that § 1348 does not require proof of willfulness, “[t]he 
elements are otherwise the same in civil and criminal actions brought under 
10b-5.”253 
Hussain argued that he could not be liable for the misrepresentation 
because he did not receive any benefit for it.254 Hussain relied upon United 
States v. Mahaffy in stating that § 1348’s nexus to a security requirement is 
satisfied where “as a result of the scheme, the defendants either benefitted, or 
attempted to benefit, from trading in securities.”255 The court rejected 
Hussain’s argument by noting that the Mahaffy condition of a benefit is not a 
necessary one, and, more specifically, applied to liability for insiders 
divulging non-public information, and cited Dirks as standing for that 
principle.256 As such, the Hussain court ignored the Mahaffy precedent by 
stating that “this case does not allege insider trading.”257 
This statement, of course, begs the question that insider trading under 
§ 1348 perhaps does require proof of a benefit as outlined in Dirks. The major 
takeaway from the Hussain case is that the court underwent a deep dive into 
Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence in order to interpret and apply the standards for 
§ 1348. The court did not take the tack that the Slawson and Melvin courts 
did, which looked only at the elements of § 1348 in their plain language. 
Finally, Hussain argued that § 1348 is unconstitutionally vague, a claim 
that the court dismissed, but the substance of which is considered below.258 
Importantly, the Hussain court dismissed this argument by stating that the 
defendant had sufficient notice of § 1348. “The government has been 
prosecuting criminal securities fraud for a long time. Combined with the plain 
language of § 1348, the cases decided under § 10(b) . . . sufficed to put 
Hussain on notice of the government’s theory here.”259 
 
251. Id. (quoting United States v. Vilar, 729 F.3d 62, 88 (2d Cir. 2013)). 
252. Id. (citing SEC v. Apuzzo, 689 F.3d 204, 212 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Berger, 
587 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
253. Id. 
254. Id. at *8. 
255. Id. (quoting United States v. Mahaffy, No. 05-CR-613, 2006 WL 2224518, at *11 
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2006)). 
256. Id. (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983)). 
257. Id. 
258. See supra Part III.C.3. 
259. Hussain, 2017 WL 4865562, at *9. 
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2. United States v. Mahaffy260 
The defendant in Hussain relied upon Mahaffy, and the facts and holding 
of Mahaffy are informative for purposes of this Article. In Mahaffy, 
defendants ran a front-running scheme, meaning that the day trading 
defendants bought information from the defendant stockbrokers; the day 
traders then purchased or sold securities before the institutional clients of the 
stockbrokers purchased or sold large blocks of the same securities.261 
Specifically, the stockbrokers allowed the day traders to listen secretly to the 
brokerage firms’ internal broadcasts concerning large orders. These 
broadcasts were on internal speaker systems known as “squawk boxes.”262 
Defendants were charged with, among other things, violating § 1348, and 
they moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to allege that defendants 
“intended to cause an economic loss to any holder or putative holder of the 
securities at issue.”263 
The court began its analysis by stating that the government needed only to 
prove a violation of § 1348(1), which requires proof of only three elements: 
(1) fraudulent intent; (2) a scheme or artifice to defraud; and (3) a nexus with 
a security.264 Regarding defendants’ argument that there was no cognizable 
victim in the scheme, the court stated that the statute does “not restrict, or 
even contemplate, the status of the victim.”265 Rather, it was sufficient that 
the Indictment alleged that the defendants intended to defraud “any person in 
connection with any security.”266 The court clarified this by stating that the 
requirement that the scheme “be ‘in connection’ with a security is satisfied 
where as a result of the scheme, the defendants either benefitted, or attempted 
to benefit, from trading in securities.”267 Analogizing to § 1347, preventing 
health care fraud, the court noted that Congress intended for the statute to 
 
260. No. 05-CR-613, 2006 WL 2224518, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2006). 
261. Id. 
262. Id. at *3. 
263. Id. at *12. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Hatfield, No. 06–CR–0550, 2009 
WL 2182593, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 22, 2009) (“The court finds that the ‘in connection with’ 
language in Section 1348 does not refer solely to the purchase or sale of securities specifically 
made by Defendant. Rather, Section 1348 is broad, and was not enacted to punish only the 
fraudulent obtainment of money or property in connection with Defendant’s purchase or sale of 
any security.”). Further, the Hatfield court stated, like § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act 
of 1934, “[t]here is no requirement that an individual defendant actually buy or sell securities.” 
Id. (quoting United States v. Ferrarini, 9 F. Supp. 2d 284, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)). 
267. Mahaffy, 2006 WL 2224518, at *12 (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 
(1997)). 
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include a “wide range of conduct” as well as “not only . . . protect the holders 
of securities, but to prohibit all forms of fraudulent conduct associated with 
securities, regardless of who the conduct affects.”268 
After addressing the “in connection with a security” element of § 1348, 
the court addressed the remaining two elements, (1) whether a scheme or 
artifice to defraud was properly alleged; and (2) whether the government 
alleged fraudulent intent. Regarding the first element, the court directly 
applied the case law related to § 1346, honest services fraud, as well as mail 
fraud.269 The court analyzed United States v. Rybicki270 to analogize to both 
honest services and mail fraud. “To apply Rybicki’s holding to a charge under 
18 U.S.C. § 1348, it is necessary only to substitute ‘in connection with a 
security’ for ‘use the mails or wire to.’”271 The court in Mahaffy then made 
clear that the fraud must include a “material misrepresentation or omission” 
under a broader standard than “reasonably foreseeable harm” but that neither 
standard “requires an actual economic loss nor an intent to economically 
harm.”272 Rather, “[t]he materiality test only requires that the 
misrepresentation or omission ‘would naturally tend to lead or is capable of 
leading a reasonable employer to change its conduct.’”273 This language 
makes sense in the context of honest services fraud but is more opaque in 
relation to securities fraud. The court attempted to clarify its rule by stating 
“[p]otential harm is the only prerequisite” given that economic harm is not 
required to prove the existence of a scheme or artifice to defraud.274 The court 
held, therefore, that because the brokerage firms’ reputations would be 
damaged by the front-running scheme, the firms could face economic harm; 
thus, the element of “scheme or artifice to defraud” was met.275 
Further, the court turned to the principle set forth in Carpenter that 
misappropriation of confidential business information, even without proof of 
monetary loss to victims, “can be sufficient to support mail and wire fraud—
and by extension, securities fraud—convictions.”276 The court also relied 
 
268. Id. (citing United States v. Lucien, 347 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2003) (analyzing § 1347 and 
the breadth of the heath care fraud statute’s definition of victim)). 
269. Id. at *12–16 (noting that although the indictment did not allege a deprivation of the 
intangible right of honest services, “it need not for the Court to apply § 1346, because this section 
only provides a legal definition of criminal activity already encompassed and charged by the 
language tracking § 1348”). 
270. 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003). 
271. Mahaffy, 2006 WL 2224518, at *13. 
272. Id. (citing United States v. Vinyard, 266 F.3d 320, 327–29 (4th Cir. 2001)). 
273. Id. (citing Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 145). 
274. Id. (citing United States v. Coffey, 361 F. Supp. 2d 102, 118 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)). 
275. Id. at *14–15. 
276. Id. at *14. 
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upon the fact that the brokers had failed to tell their firms that they were 
selling the information, which represented a breach of duty, thereby 
defrauding the firms and the firms’ institutional clients of honest services.277 
The court also carried over the application of § 1346 honest services fraud 
into its assessment of fraudulent intent. The court noted that the rule requires 
intent to deceive and intent to cause harm but also states that “fraudulent 
intent may be inferred from the scheme itself” when the result of the scheme 
is to injure others.278 In the next sentence, the court stated with somewhat 
circular reasoning that when the scheme results in the deprivation of honest 
services (despite not being charged in Mahaffy), “[t]he only intent that need 
be proven . . . is the intent to deprive another of the intangible right of honest 
services.”279 
Importantly, the Mahaffy court also addressed defendant’s argument about 
the rule of lenity in the application of § 1348.280 Specifically, defendants 
alleged that the government was predicating criminal liability on alleged 
conduct that was “at best . . . on the far edges of the securities laws’ scope.”281 
In response, the court stated that the front-running scheme “might well have 
been charged either as a more general mail and wire fraud or a more specific 
10-b(5) [sic] securities fraud.”282 The court acknowledged that it analyzed 
§ 1348 “by analogy to similar crimes and similar statutes.”283 Because the 
fraud in Mahaffy was not tipper-tippee insider trading, the ultimate question 
is whether the same analogies and standards for that crime under § 10(b) 
should be imported for § 1348. 
3. SEC v. Stein284 
Unlike Hussain and Mahaffy, SEC v. Stein was not a criminal case. 
Nevertheless, this case is important because it stands for the principle that the 
defendant’s criminal conviction under § 1348 allowed for summary judgment 
in the related civil case. In Stein, the defendant appealed a district court’s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the SEC. The SEC claimed the 
 
277. Id. at *15. Again, the court substitutes honest services fraud as the standard for proving 
the existence of a fraud, and ostensibly (because it does not state this explicitly) relies upon the 
“in connection with a security” to apply that same standard to § 1348. 
278. Id. at *16 (citing United States v. D’Amato, 39 F.3d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
279. Id. (citing Rybicki, 354 F.3d at 145). 
280. Id. at *18; see also infra Part IV.C (regarding analysis of the rule of lenity). 
281. Mahaffy, 2006 WL 2224518, at *18. 
 282. Id. 
283. Id. 
284. 906 F.3d 823, 834 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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defendant violated various securities laws and argued in its motion for 
summary judgment that the related criminal conviction against Stein for the 
same conduct precluded him from contesting the allegations at issue in the 
civil case.285 
Stein was not an insider trading case. Defendant Michael Stein was an 
attorney who acted as purported outside counsel to Heart Tronics. Stein and 
the company engaged in a series of frauds involving false purchase orders 
with fictitious companies.286 The frauds were designed to inflate Heart 
Tronic’s stock price.287 Concurrent with the SEC’s case against Stein, the 
DOJ filed a criminal case against him for the same activity, charging him 
with three counts of securities fraud under § 1348, three counts of wire fraud, 
three counts of mail fraud, one count of conspiracy to commit mail and wire 
fraud, three counts of money laundering, and one count of conspiracy to 
obstruction of justice.288 The DOJ then intervened in the SEC action to stay 
discovery pending the outcome of the criminal matter.289 Stein was convicted 
by a jury on all counts.290 
Following his conviction, the SEC moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that the “criminal conviction ‘necessarily decided’ the facts needed to 
establish [Stein’s] liability in the related civil case.”291 The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the SEC. Stein appealed.292 The Ninth 
Circuit considered whether the SEC could avail itself of the doctrine of 
“‘offensive nonmutual issue preclusion,’ which prevents ‘a defendant from 
relitigating the issues which a defendant previously litigated and lost against 
another plaintiff.’”293 
The court reiterated that in order to claim that a prior criminal conviction 
should act as the basis for offensive preclusion, the following elements must 
be present: 
(1) the prior conviction was for a serious offense; (2) the issue at 
stake in the civil proceeding is identical to the issue raised in the 
prior criminal proceeding; (3) there was a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate the issue at the prior trial; and (4) the issue on which the 
 
285. Id. at 826. 
286. Id. 
287. Id. 
288. Id. at 827. 
289. Id. 
290. Id. at 828. 
291. Id. 
292. Id. 
293. Id. (citing Syverson v. IBM Corp., 472 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal 
citations omitted)). 
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prior conviction is offered was actually litigated and necessarily 
decided at trial.294 
As the court outlined, there are typically four factors to consider when 
deciding if the issues are identical for purposes of issue preclusion: (1) 
whether there is “substantial overlap between the evidence or argument to be 
advanced in the second proceeding and that advanced in the first”; (2) 
whether “the new evidence or argument involve[s] the application of the 
same rule of law as that involved in the prior proceeding”; (3) whether 
“pretrial preparation and discovery related to the matter presented in the first 
action reasonably can be expected to have embraced the matter sought to be 
presented in the second”; and (4) whether “the claims involved in the two 
proceedings” are closely related.295 
With these rubrics in mind, the court determined that the same fraudulent 
scheme underpinned Stein’s criminal conviction and the § 10(b) claims 
brought by the SEC. In other words, the court concluded that “Stein’s 
conviction determined the identical issues the SEC was required to prove to 
establish Stein’s liability for securities fraud.”296 More importantly for 
purposes of this Article, the court went on to state that “the SEC’s securities 
fraud claims involve the ‘application of the same rule of law’ as that involved 
in the criminal case.”297 
The court noted under § 1348 that the jury was required to find “(1) a 
scheme or artifice to defraud, (2) with fraudulent intent, (3) in connection 
with any security.”298 The court therefore held that “the DOJ proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt the same issues the SEC needed to prove only by a 
preponderance of the evidence. There is no difference in the applicable legal 
standards that would affect the outcome of the civil case.”299 
Although the Stein case did not involve insider trading, it represents an 
important issue that could apply to insider trading § 10(b) cases. That is, if a 
defendant is found guilty for insider trading under § 1348, the SEC could 
move for summary judgment on § 10(b) insider trading claims under the same 
reasoning as was applied in Stein, thereby effectively doing an entire end-
 
294. Id. (citing Ayers v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
295. Id. at 828–29 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c (AM. LAW 
INST. 1982)). “The assessment of the similarity of issues necessary to decide whether collateral 
estoppel should preclude relitigation of a particular issue varies with the facts of each case.” JACK 
H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.10 (5th ed. 
2015). 
296. Stein, 906 F.3d at 830. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. 
299. Id. Interestingly, the court was referring to the elements required under § 17(a) as closely 
related enough to those of § 1348. 
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around of the Dirks personal benefit test and its progeny. The following Part 
addresses this problematic collateral consequence of charging insider trading 
under § 1348. 
IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF A NEW INSIDER TRADING STATUTE 
Is § 1348 a sufficient fix to solving the issues surrounding insider trading? 
Do the headaches caused by the judicial interpretation of Rule 10b-5 dissipate 
if insider trading is charged only under § 1348 going forward? If not, how 
shall we go about solving the thorny issues surrounding insider trading? For 
starters, we need clarification on what the crime is and who the victim is. 
These two questions are inherently interrelated. If the crime is market 
unfairness, and the crime is one of fraud perpetrated on the market as a victim, 
then that would shape the prosecutorial strategy. If the crime is the theft of 
corporate information as a property right, and the victim therefore is the 
company, then that dictates, perhaps, a different prosecutorial approach.300 
These options, however, are not mutually exclusive. Both crimes could occur 
with both types of victims. The fact that all of these facets are lumped together 
under one nebulous, largely judicially created prohibition on insider trading 
is the reason that there is no quick fix. Given that the aforementioned 
questions attempt to tackle immense theoretical issues, it is worth looking at 
the issues specific to § 1348 that arise in the cases mentioned above. This Part 
addresses some of the ramifications of charging § 1348 in lieu of § 10(b). 
Finally, this Part looks at the rule of lenity, given the innumerous questions 
surrounding the crime of insider trading and the application of the laws 
prohibiting it, and suggests that the rule of lenity should apply to insider 
trading charges under § 1348. 
A. Inversion of Criminal and Civil Burdens of Proof for Insider 
Trading 
One issue with avoiding criminal insider trading charges under § 10(b) 
and instead opting to charge § 1348 is that the elements for § 1348 are less 
burdensome than for those of § 10(b). Because § 10(b) can be the basis of a 
civil suit brought by the SEC, the practical consequence of this burden 
 
 300. Indeed, this was the issue upon which Judge Kearse dissented in Blaszczak. United 
States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 45–49 (2d Cir. 2019) (Kearse, J., dissenting). Judge Kearse was 
not convinced that the CMS information constituted property or a thing of value, nor that the 
government agency could be considered a victim of theft based on the facts. Id. at 47. 
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inversion is that it is much easier to convict for criminal securities fraud than 
it is for civil insider trading, despite both charges being brought from the 
same set of facts. This is precisely the outcome from Blaszczak.301 The court 
affirmed the jury’s determination that the defendants were guilty of violating 
§ 1348 but not guilty on the § 10(b) claims because the jury did not find that 
the government had proven the existence of a personal benefit, as is required 
under § 10(b).302 
This inversion of civil and criminal standards seemingly implicates 
foundational concepts of law.303 Insider trading under § 10(b) is somewhat 
unique in that it can be brought under either a civil or criminal standard, but 
the test remains the same. This means that a civil action brought by the SEC 
under § 10(b) will be harder to prove, despite the lower burden of proof, than 
the criminal action brought under § 1348 for the same alleged activity. This 
seemingly distorts the purpose of criminal law304 and hamstrings the SEC as 
an agency that likely would not be able to bring many successful civil actions 
on insider trading, despite being tasked by Congress to maintain fairness of 
the securities markets.305 William Stuntz’s article on this point makes clear 
that there is inherent risk when legislators decide what is and what is not a 
crime, and then which procedures to apply.306 He argues that there is 
significant risk for overcriminalization of activities when the legislature 
designates authority to prosecutors. Insider trading seems ripe for this type of 
criticism, given that the codified law itself is silent as to the activity, and one 
is left to wade through decades of common law under only § 10(b) to 
ascertain the parameters of the prohibited activity.307 
 
301. See supra Part II.A and accompanying notes. 
302. Id. 
303. See, e.g., Samuel W. Buell, Culpability and Modern Crime, 103 GEO. L.J. 547, 548 
(2015) (outlining the purposes of criminal law and recognizing the need for courts to assess 
whether defendants were aware of normative wrongfulness or were merely negligent). 
304. See generally William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 38–40 (1996). 
305. This fact should not be understated. Insider trading affects markets and market fairness. 
To shift prosecution of insider trading to criminal enforcement bodies only could shift the role 
and purpose of the SEC. See, e.g., Karen E. Woody, Conflict Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s 
New Role as Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1320–22 
(2012) (describing the tripartite role of the SEC as authorized by Congress in the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act). 
306. Stuntz, supra note 304, at 1. 
307. Id. at 16–18. 
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B. Imputation of Liability in Civil Summary Judgment 
A related issue to the inverted burdens of proof is the imputation of 
liability simply because of a criminal conviction. This is what happened in 
SEC v. Stein, discussed above.308 In that case, the SEC was able to piggyback 
on the criminal conviction for securities fraud, albeit not for insider trading. 
As a result, the SEC moved for summary judgment based upon the criminal 
conviction arising from the same set of facts. If applied to § 10(b) insider 
trading cases, a conviction under § 1348 could serve as the basis for civil 
liability for insider trading without ever mentioning the Dirks test or the other 
fifty years of jurisprudence stemming from § 10(b).309 
The writings of William Stuntz are informative on this point, as well.310 
When an overcriminalized activity has collateral effects in the civil realm, it 
seems that the function of the law is diluted if not entirely lost. The fact that 
the SEC can take up the mantle of additional civil prosecution on the heels of 
a criminal prosecution strikes one as a classic case of double jeopardy; yet, 
as was the case in United States v. Ying,311 detailed above, there is no claim 
for double jeopardy when one of the matters at issue is a civil claim. That is, 
double jeopardy only attaches to a subsequent criminal action. Though this is 
certainly the black letter law, it is worthy of a harder look when seen through 
the lens of insider trading and the nebulous parameters for the prohibited 
activity. 
The example of the Stein case suggests that insider trading precedent under 
§ 10(b) is effectively a dead letter. The SEC will allow the DOJ to pursue the 
easier outcome of criminal liability under § 1348, and then take advantage of 
imputing the criminal conviction as proof for the civil action without ever 
addressing the elements of § 10(b) liability established by the courts for the 
past five decades. 
C. Rule of Lenity 
The risk of an inverted standard for civil and criminal actions based on the 
same nucleus of facts suggests that a closer look should be given to § 1348, 
and one that may involve the statutory construction canons.312 As noted 
 
308. See supra Part III.C and accompanying notes. 
309. Indeed, the interplay and overlap between the SEC and DOJ on related matters can be 
problematic, particularly in insider trading cases and others. 
310. Stuntz, supra note 304, at 38–40. 
311. See supra Part III.A and accompanying notes. 
312. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ 
STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 407–45 (2016); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, 
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above, the defendants in Mahaffy raised the issue of the rule of lenity.313 
Although Mahaffy was not a classic insider trading case but instead a case 
involving a front-running scheme, the argument that insider trading law, and 
the application of § 1348 in particular, is not clear and therefore should be 
afforded the rule of lenity is meritorious.314 
The rule of lenity is “almost as old as the common law itself”315 and 
instructs judges to construe ambiguous criminal statutes narrowly and in 
favor of the defendant.316 In practicality, this means that when a criminal law 
is open to interpretation by the judiciary, a court must select the “less severe 
interpretation, absent clear and definite language by Congress.”317 
The rule of lenity is analogous to Chevron deference afforded to agencies’ 
interpretations.318 Chevron deference and its interplay with the rule of lenity 
is particularly apt when considering insider trading, given that insider trading 
can be prosecuted in the civil and criminal arenas, with the SEC as 
administrative agency bringing civil actions. In other words, the SEC’s 
interpretation and use of insider trading prohibitions would be afforded 
Chevron deference; likewise, the DOJ’s criminal actions for insider trading 
 
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 296–302 (2012); Cass R. Sunstein, Law 
and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2106–07 (1990). 
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could require application of the rule of lenity. Chevron review involves a two-
step process.319 In the first step, the court must assess whether the meaning of 
the statute at issue is ambiguous or susceptible to multiple interpretations.320 
If the court answers that first inquiry in the affirmative, it then must determine 
whether the agency interpretation of the statute is reasonable.321 Chevron 
deference requires courts to accept the agency interpretation if it is deemed 
reasonable. Similarly, the lenity framework requires a determination as to 
whether a challenged criminal statute (or a civil statute with criminal 
consequences, as is the case for § 10(b)) is open to multiple plausible 
interpretations.322 If multiple interpretations exist, and statutory construction 
yields more than one plausible reading, “lenity would apply to require 
selection of the narrowest such reading.”323 
When considering both Chevron deference and the rule of lenity as 
applying to civil or criminal insider trading under § 10(b), it seems both 
rubrics would be appropriate given the general ambiguity in recent case law 
surrounding the parameters of insider trading, particularly in cases involving 
remote tipper-tippees.324 However, it is arguably even more appropriate for 
the rule of lenity to apply for tipper-tippee insider trading charges under 
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18 U.S.C. § 1348 given the scant jurisprudential treatment of insider trading 
under that statute, and the potential for serious punishment associated with 
the criminal charge under § 1348. 
Liza Fleming addresses this concept by pointing out certain ways in which 
insider trading is unique among “administrative crimes.”325 Fleming 
underscores that insider trading is considered a malum prohibitum crime, 
meaning only prohibited by statute or regulation, and, in the case of tipper-
tippees, only prohibited based upon the relationship between tipper-tippee if 
no personal benefit exists.326 Drawing on the work of Professor Dan Kahan, 
Fleming argues that lenity is appropriate for § 10(b) insider trading cases, 
rather than blind deference to the SEC and its administrative agenda.327 Lenity 
is even more appropriate in the cases where insider trading is charged under 
§ 1348 as a stand-alone criminal statute with increased penalties and 
consequences. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has provided the backdrop to insider trading and the ever-
changing elements for proving the civil and criminal elements of insider 
trading under § 10(b). However, this Article has posited that the elements of 
insider trading under § 10(b) may soon be wholly irrelevant for criminal 
prosecution given the flexibility and “blank slate” afforded by charging 
insider trading under § 1348. The recent case at the Second Circuit, United 
States v. Blaszczak teed up the myriad issues with proceeding under this new 
regime. Although mail and wire fraud charges have always been in the 
government’s arsenal for any fraud-based claim, the fact that insider trading 
is a malum prohibitum claim, and one that is only illegal in a tipper-tippee 
situation if there is a personal benefit conferred, it seems that an entirely new 
construct for insider trading may arise under § 1348 prosecutions. The result 
will be an inversion of civil and criminal standards as related to insider 
trading. The ever-moving target of defining the crime itself suggests that the 
rule of lenity is appropriate until Congress acts, or some other definitive lines 
for insider trading are drawn. 
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